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CHOOSING PERSPECTIVES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Ronald J. Bacigal"
In this Article, Professor Bacigal examines the Supreme Court's use of
various perspectives in examining the reasonableness of searches and sei-
zures. Although the Supreme Court purports to rely on a consistent method
of constitutional analysis when rendering decisions on Fourth Amendment
issues, the case law in this area indicates that the Court is influenced some-
times by the citizen's perspective, sometimes by the police officers' perspec-
tive, and sometimes by the perspective of the hypothesized reasonable per-
son.
After identifying the role of perspectives in a number of seminal Court
decisions, Professor Bacigal discusses the benefits and limitations of the
Court's reliance on the various perspectives prevalent in criminal procedure
cases. He notes that over time the Court increasingly has viewed cases sole-
ly from the police officers' perception of the reasonableness of their actions
and thus that the Court has weakened the protection of citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights.
Professor Bacigal advocates a principled approach to choosing perspec-
tives and assesses several such approaches. He concludes by asking both
the Court and its critics to find ways to enhance the Court's ability to bal-
ance social interests with the individual's "right to be let alone." To ade-
quately protect this right, Professor Bacigal suggests that the Court display
increased sensitivity to the individual's perspective in search and seizure
cases.
At Center Court Wimbledon it is entertaining to watch the ball shift
back and forth between the opponents. It is less captivating to observe con-
stitutional analysis in which the United States Supreme Court appears to
hide the ball, or at least makes it difficult to appreciate the nature of the
game being played, as it shifts between objective and subjective perspectives
of citizens, police officers, and hypothesized reasonable people. Unlike ten-
nis, where stroke and counterstroke are the essence of the game and visible
for all to see, constitutional analysis often obscures the fact that it is highly
dependent upon the Court's vacillating choice of perspectives, and concomi-
tantly, the identification of the appropriate decision maker. Although most
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond, The T.C. Williams School of Law. I
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Supreme Court cases center on whether a particular outcome is constitution-
al, this question is uniquely related to the questions of who should decide
what is constitutional, and who should decide who decides. Of course the
Court is always the final decision maker when interpreting the Constitution,
but there are times when the Court defers to the decisions of police, reason-
ably prudent people, or individual citizens by adopting their perspectives.
Consider the diverse perspectives the Court applies to a seemingly sim-
ple scenario that begins with a police officer approaching a pedestrian and
stating, "Please stop, I'd like to talk to you." The initial question for the
Court is whether the officer's actions constitute a Fourth Amendment sei-
zure of the pedestrian.1 That question is answered by an objective assess-
ment of the situation as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable person:
Would such a hypothetical person have felt free to leave?2 At this point, it
is constitutionally irrelevant whether the citizen subjectively believed that he
or she had to submit to the request to stop,3 or whether the officer subjec-
tively intended to prevent the citizen from walking away.
4
If application of this objective standard were to indicate that a reason-
able person would not have felt free to leave, the Court would then discard
the perspective of a hypothetical person and would examine the way this
particular citizen responded to the police officer.5 Submission to the
officer's request could constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, but, resis-
tance would reduce the officer's request to a mere "attempted seizure,"
which is beyond the coverage of the Amendment.6 Submission, however,
"If there is no detention-no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment-then no constitutional rights have been infringed." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 498 (1983). "[W]here the [F]ourth [A]mendment is inapplicable, the law does not
give a constitutional damn about noncompliance." Charles E. Moylan, The Fourth
Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold
of 'So What'?, 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 76.
' "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion).
' The Mendenhall rule which governs seizures of a person, "looks, not to the sub-
jective perceptions of the person questioned, but rather, to the objective characteristics
of the encounter that may suggest whether a reasonable person would have felt free to
leave." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 640 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' "[Tihe subjective intention of the DEA agent in this case to detain the respondent,
had she attempted to leave, is irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed
to the respondent." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 n.6.
' See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628; see also Woodson v. Commonwealth, 429 S.E.2d
27, 29 (Va. 1993) ("[T]he issue ... [is] not what a reasonable person would have as-
sumed under the circumstances, but what the accused actually did in response to the
police officer's show of authority.").
6 "[N]either usage nor common-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure."
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does not end the Court's inquiry because the encounter also must be exam-
ined from the officer's perspective. If the officer did not seize the citizen
through "means intentionally applied,"' there would be, at most, an "acci-
dental seizure," which, like an attempted seizure, falls outside the scope of
the Fourth Amendment.8
The interplay between objective and subjective perspectives continues if
the citizen were to stop and face the officer, who then asks, "May I see
some identification?" If the citizen were to comply by producing his wallet,
the Court must then discern whether the wallet was surrendered voluntari-
ly,9 or whether there was mere acquiescence to a police command that left
the citizen no choice.' Consent is determined by employing a subjective
perspective that takes into account all surrounding circumstances, including
the citizen's personal characteristics (characteristics that are irrelevant when
defining a seizure of the person according to the objective perception of a
reasonable person)." The applicable standard shifts once again, however, if
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 n.2; see infra text accompanying note 54.
" "[A] Fourth Amendment seizure ... [occurs] only when there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower v.
Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).
- See Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right of the People to Be Secure, 82 KY. L.J. 145
(1994) (discussing both attempted and accidental seizures).
' See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see also United States v.
Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990). The
circuit court cautioned that the lower court had "treated the tests for seizure and volun-
tary consent as identical. Although there is overlap in these tests, they are not identi-
cal." Id.
10 The prosecution's burden to prove free and voluntary consent to a search "cannot
be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority."
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); see also Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968) (discussing "a show of ... authority which left [the suspect] no
choice"); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(denouncing an encounter in which "[t]he citizen's choice is quietly to submit to what-
ever the officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence").
" In United States v. Analla, 975 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
1033 (1993), the court held that the initial approach by the police toward the suspect
was governed by the standard for seizures of the person---"an objective test, not a sub-
jective one." Id. at 124. Thus, the fact that the particular suspect "thought, based on his
experience with Moroccan police, that he would be restrained or even tortured should
he try to leave" was irrelevant. Id. The court, finding no seizure, held that the subse-
quent request to search the suspect's vehicle was governed by the standard for consen-
sual searches-"a factual question determined in light of the totality of the circumstanc-
es." Id. at 125. Consequently, it was relevant that the defendant was "24 years
old ... had ... graduated from high school and had attended some col-
lege ... appeared intelligent, [and] articulated his views and positions well . . . ." Id.;
see also United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he determina-
tion of consent to search is subjective.").
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the officer were to misperceive the citizen's subjective intent. For example,
suppose the citizen voluntarily surrendered his wallet for the limited purpose
of allowing the officer to examine the citizen's identification papers, but the
officer scanned the papers and then opened other compartments of the wal-
let. At this point, the Court would discard the citizen's subjective intent and
turns to the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer: Could such an
officer have believed that he had obtained consent to examine the entire
wallet? 12
The same shifting of perspectives becomes relevant in a Fifth Amend-
ment context if the encounter were to continue with the officer commenting
on the contents of the wallet. For example: "This bag of white powder looks
like cocaine." Although at this point the citizen may have been seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes, this seizure is not equivalent to custody, a
necessary prerequisite for the Miranda warnings. 3 For purposes of
Miranda,4 custody is determined from the vantage point of "how a reason-
able man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation,"'5
and by examining whether the particular suspect was subjectively aware that
he faced a police officer. 6
The Court's inquiry must continue, however, because custody alone does
not trigger Miranda; there also must be police interrogation. 7 In order to
define interrogation, the Court switches perspectives to that of a reasonable
police officer, asking whether an officer would know that his comment
about the cocaine was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect."'" As an added complication, this particular use of the
reasonable person perspective incorporates the subjective perceptions of both
the officer and the suspect. 9
12 See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) ("The standard for measuring the
scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reason-
ableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect?") (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-
89 (1990)).
13 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984).
14 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 Berkermer, 468 U.S. at 442.
16 In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the issue was whether Miranda ap-
plied to a situation in which a police undercover agent, feigning to be a cellmate, ques-
tioned a suspect in his jail cell. The Court found that, because the suspect subjectively
did not know he was being interrogated by the police, the suspect was not under coer-
cion, and thus Miranda did not apply. See id. at 300.
1 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980).
18 Id. at 301 (citation omitted).
"Any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of
a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determin-
ing whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 302 n.8.
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Suppose that this encounter were to conclude with the citizen attempting
to flee after the officer referred to cocaine. The officer thwarted the escape
by producing his weapon, shoving the citizen against a wall, and roughly
patting him down while giving the Miranda warnings. The citizen then
stated, "It's not my cocaine, I'm holding it for a friend." The admissibility
of the citizen's statement hinges upon a determination that the statement was
voluntary and obtained after the suspect waived his Miranda rights to re-
main silent and to have the assistance of counsel.2' Voluntariness would be
assessed from the suspect's perspective in order to determine whether the
self-incrimination was the product of the suspect's free and voluntary deci-
sion to speak, or whether the suspect's free will was overborne by the
officer's use of physical force.21 In contrast to the subjective aspects of
voluntariness, however, an objective standard is employed to determine
whether the suspect waived his Miranda rights.22
The above scenario could be extended to include booking procedures at
the police station, further interrogation of the defendant, and possible use of
a lineup, all of which involve additional Fifth and Sixth Amendment consid-
erations; however, we have given the Court enough rope, and it has already
entangled itself in a dozen variations of subjective and objective perspec-
tives of real and hypothetical people. To wit:
1. A reasonable person's perception of the officer's initial approach.
2. The suspect's actual response to the officer's approach.
3. The officer's intent to seize the person through means intentionally
applied.'
4. The suspect's subjective intent to consent to a search of his wallet.
5. A reasonable officer's perception of the scope of the consensual
search.
6. A reasonable person's perception of whether he was in police custo-
dy.
7. The suspect's subjective knowledge that he was addressing a police
officer.
8. A reasonable officer's perception of whether his comment was likely
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
9. Any unusual susceptibility of the particular defendant to covert per-
suasion.
See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985).
21 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
The standard for waiver is unsettled. In Connelly, the Court spoke of waiver as a
question of voluntariness (a subjective analysis). See id. at U.S. 169. In its most recent
discussion of the issue, however, the Court stated that the question of whether a suspect
waived or invoked Miranda rights would be assessed from the standpoint of whether "a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the [accused's] state-
ment to be a request for an attorney." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
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10. The officer's actual knowledge of the suspect's unusual suscepti-
bility.
11. The suspect's subjective ability to make a free and voluntary state-
ment.
12. An objective assessment of whether the suspect waived his Miranda
rights.
The Court uses and discards these perspectives at random, rarely pausing
to articulate a rationale for choosing a particular perspective in a specific
case. This piecemeal approach has hampered judicial development of a
coherent scheme for applying the various perspectives to the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendment problems that arise.24 A comprehensive examination
of all three amendments is beyond the scope of a single law review article,
or at least beyond the capacity of this author to address in any concise man-
ner. As a more modest start toward reconciling judicial use of interpretive
perspectives, this Article utilizes the Fourth Amendment as a touchstone for
examining the particular choices the Court has made, and for suggesting the
type of fundamental principles that should guide the Court's choicesY
I. THE COURT'S DECISIONS
The current Court's preferred method for determining reasonable search-
es and seizures is the assessment of the totality of the circumstances,' an
approach that helps obscure the underlying choice of perspectives. A com-
plete examination of the totality of the circumstances necessarily factors in
all perspectives-the subjective perspective of both the defendant and the
police officer, as well as the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable person.
' See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
Although we have not examined this exact question at great length in any of our
prior opinions, almost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the
Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.
Id.
4 The Sixth Amendment applies to interrogation occurring after the commencement
of adversarial proceedings. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). When defining interrogation for Sixth Amendment
purposes, the Court examines whether an officer "deliberately and designedly set out to
elicit information" from the defendant. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 399. For a discussion of the
differing definitions of "interrogation" under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, see Jona-
than L. Marks, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: Lower Court Misapplica-
tion of the Innis Definition of Interrogation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1077 n.27 (1989)
("Massiah turns solely on the underlying intent of the government's agents.").
' "It is both regrettable and surprising that the courts have said so little of any sub-
stance about the principles of the [A]mendment . . . ." Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities
of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49 (1976).
26 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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Although this approach is cumbersome to apply, it is difficult to fault the
Court's desire to consider all relevant factors. The problem arises when the
Justices opt to discard certain perspectives and rely exclusively on a single
perspective in assessing constitutional reasonableness. This approach allows
the Court to abdicate responsibility for determining the constitutionality of
searches and seizures by adopting, and thus deferring to, the decisions of
police, reasonably prudent people, or individual citizens. The origins of this
flawed approach can be traced to the Court's analysis of seizures of a per-
son in Terry v. Ohio.27
A. Seizures of a Person
1. The Reasonable Person's Perspective
Prior to the seminal decision in Terry v. Ohio, seizures of the person
were equated with full custodial arrests." Terry, however, extended the
scope of the Fourth Amendment to encompass temporary detentions falling
short of arrest, that is, government interference with a citizen's "freedom to
walk away" unencumbered by any restraint imposed by a police officer.29
The right-to-walk-away test for a Fourth Amendment seizure easily was
applied to the facts of Terry because the officer grabbed Terry, spun him
around, and patted him down for weapons.3" The Court had no need to ad-
dress various perspectives because from any viewpoint, Terry was not free
to leave.
In contrast to the obvious seizure in Terry, subsequent cases required the
Court to address police-citizen encounters in which the officer did not so
forcefully and unilaterally impose physical control over the citizen. For
example, United States v. Mendenhall3 and Florida v. Royer32 involved
situations in which law enforcement officials approached a suspected drug
courier in an airport concourse and asked if the suspect was willing to stop
and answer questions. Unlike the situation in Terry, the facts in Mendenhall
and Royer required the Court to choose a perspective from which to assess
whether the police-citizen encounter was consensual or whether it amounted
to a Fourth Amendment seizure.
27 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21 See, e.g., id. at 10-11.
29 See id. at 16-17.
30 See id. at 7. "[T]he officer 'seized' Terry and subjected him to a 'search' when he
took hold of him, spun him around, and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing."
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980).
31 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
32 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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When analyzing police-citizen encounters, the Court starts from the
premise that "[t]he Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and
seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary cooperation. 3 3 The Court has
fleshed out this rudimentary principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
by articulating its vision of the type of police-citizen encounter that consti-
tutes a nonseizure: It is one in which a reasonable person would not per-
ceive any restraint of his freedom of movement, and thus would voluntarily
submit to a police request to stop and answer questions.' The Court's
adoption of the reasonable person's perspective has much to recommend it,
but the Court has never explained why this perspective is preferable to the
citizen's subjective perception of government restraint or to the police
officer's subjective intent to restrain the citizen.
Any of the perspectives raised by the facts of Mendenhall and Royer
could have been incorporated into existing schools of constitutional analysis.
For example, had the Court chosen to adopt the citizen's perspective, the
Court could have drawn upon its earlier pronouncements regarding a
citizen's waiver of constitutional rights.35 A "consensual" police-citizen
encounter thus might require that a citizen knowingly and intelligently have
waived his rights to privacy and liberty.' This result, however, was not
preordained because in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,37 the Court applied a
"diluted form of 'waiver"'38 to consensual searches of property. In
Schneckloth, the Court's concern over the truth-defeating aspects of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule39 led it to distinguish consensual
searches of property from knowing and intelligent waivers of other constitu-
tional rights that "protect a fair trial and the reliability of the truth-determin-
ing process."4 What is unexplained in Mendenhall and Royer is why the
Court did not follow Schneckloth by applying the same diluted form of
waiver to consensual seizures of both property and person. The language of
the Fourth Amendment, which equally prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures of persons, houses, papers, and effects, does not support a distinc-
tion between consensual seizures of a person and consensual searches and
seizures of a person's property."' The language in Schneckloth may have
33 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
4 See id. at 434 ("Our cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply be-
cause a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.").
31 See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (defining waiver in the context
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
36 Waiver ordinarily requires "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." Id. at 464.
" 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
38 Id. at 245.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
40 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236.
41 The gap between the Court's discussions of consensual seizures of the person or
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"diluted" the rigorous standard for knowing and intelligent waiver of consti-
tutional rights, but even the diluted standard remains a form of waiver that
inherently focuses on the citizen's subjective perspective, that is, the
citizen's actual belief as to whether he freely permitted or prohibited a
search of property;" yet, when addressing seizures of a person, the Court
in Mendenhall and Royer discarded this perspective without even mention-
ing Schneckloth.
Mendenhall and Royer are equally opaque in their sub silentio rejection
of the police officer's perspective, that is, whether the officer subjectively
intended to restrain the suspect. Examining the officer's perspective would
have been consistent with the Fourth Amendment goal of regulating the use
and abuse of government power,43 a goal the Court in Terry cited when it
reaffirmed the judiciary's "traditional responsibility to guard against police
conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal
security."" By claiming fidelity to Terry and the Fourth Amendment's cen-
tral purpose of regulating government power,4" the Court in Mendenhall
might have insisted that an officer not act on his intent to detain a citizen
of property may be narrowing. In California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), the
Court stressed the difference between seizures of the person and seizures of property,
see infra text accompanying note 62, but the Fourth Circuit recently suggested that, "in
light of the Court's evolving views on the relevancy of common law in defining Fourth
Amendment 'seizures,' it is at least plausible that . . .[Hodari D.] may ultimately be
held to extend to objects as well as persons." United States v. Letsinger, 93 F.3d 140,
143 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2437 (1997). For a discussion of the
Letsinger decision, see infra text accompanying notes 249-58.
42 "In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the con-
sent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions,
as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
41 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 368 (1974) (stating that the Fourth Amendment is best viewed as a regulato-
ry canon).
44 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15; see also Shirley M. Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdi-
rections of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 546, 552
(1971) (stating that government conduct not classified as a search or seizure is immu-
nized from scrutiny, even though it resulted from such illegitimate, or even malicious,
motives as governmental curiosity, a desire to gather and report interesting information,
or personal distaste for the political philosophies or lifestyles of certain citizens).
4' The Framers of the Fourth Amendment were concerned with indiscriminate gov-
ernment intrusions, which
expose people and their possessions to interferences by government when there is
no good reason to do so. The concern here is against unjustified searches and
seizures: it rests upon the principle that every citizen is entitled to security of his
person and property unless and until an adequate justification for disturbing that
security is shown.
Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 411.
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unless the officer has good cause to do so.4 6 Instead, the Court disregarded
the officer's intent and accorded constitutional status to a hypothetical con-
struct (the reasonable person test) while overlooking the fact that a citizen is
not free to leave when an officer intends to block any effort by the citizen
to terminate the encounter. 7
In the end, Mendenhall and Royer ignored the states of mind of both the
citizen and the officer in favor of a focus on the perceptions. of a hypotheti-
cal reasonable person. This focus is not clearly wrong, because the Court
has a legitimate concern for the proper allocation of judicial resources and
for the potentially futile and costly effort of inquiring into subjective states
of mind." Although the Court has expressed its concern for the potential
costs of inquiring into a citizen's or police officer's subjective intent; there
has been no serious attempt to assess the actual costs and benefits of such
an inquiry, nor has there been any attempt to distinguish other situations in
which the Court has attached constitutional significance to a citizen's or
officer's subjective state of mind. 9 As to the potential futility of inquiring
46 Interpreting state constitutional law, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated:
We cannot allow the police to randomly "encounter" individuals without any
objective basis for suspecting them of misconduct and then place them in a coer-
cive environment in order to develop reasonable suspicion to justify their deten-
tion. This investigative technique is based on the proposition that an otherwise
innocent person, who comes under police scrutiny for no good reason, is not inno-
cent unless he or she convinces the police that he or she is. Such a procedure is
anathema to our constitutional freedoms.
State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 365 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1031 (1993).
"" "The Fourth Amendment ... [is] not directed at some hypothetical government
agent and what he might or would have done. [it] exist[s] to regulate the actual conduct
of actual government agents in actual cases." Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43
EMORY L.J. 1311, 1335 (1994); see also John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth
Amendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1133
(1988-89) ("The danger in 'reasoning from hypothetical to actual results is that if the
supposed facts are not true to life, the judgment drawn from them will be equally artifi-
cial.").
" See Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)
(proclaiming that the inquiry into the subjective state of mind of police officers would
be a costly "misallocation of judicial resources").
" See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (holding that a defendant may be
entitled to a hearing on the accuracy of an affidavit upon a showing that police made a
deliberate falsehood); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (noting situations
in which the motivation of the officer is to perform "community caretaking functions,
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
the violation of a criminal statute"); United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that Franks requires subjective bad faith). See generally Ronald J.
Bacigal, An Alternative Approach to the Good Faith Controversy, 37 MERCER L. REV.
957 (1986) (arguing that recognition of both good and bad faith by police officers as
relevant factors in the totality of circumstances is consistent with the Court's overall
686 [Vol. 6:3
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into subjective intent, the Court recently announced that its prior decisions
were not based on "the evidentiary difficulty of establishing Subjective in-
tent.
5 °
What is futile, however, is to read the Mendenhall and Royer opinions
in hopes of discovering an assessment of the relevant merits of the various
perspectives, or some hint of the justification that prompted the Court to
adopt the reasonable person's perspective. The closest the Court has come to
explaining its choice of perspectives has been a terse statement in Michigan
v. Chesternut:51 "This 'reasonable person' standard also ensures that the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind
of the particular individual being approached."52 The Court did not explain
why, in Schneckloth, it accepted this type of variation when dealing with
consensual searches of property, but did not accept the same variation when
dealing with seizures of the person. Perhaps it is the failure to identify some
guiding principle for defining consensual searches and seizures that led the
Court to graft two additional perspectives onto the reasonable person stan-
dard. 3
2. The Citizen's Perspective
Mendenhall's focus on the perceptions of a reasonable person was sub-
sequently identified by the Court as "a necessary, but not a sufficient condi-
tion for seizure .. . ." An additional necessary condition is the citizen's
actual submission to a show of authority that had objectively communicated
that the citizen was not free to leave. The Court announced this additional
requirement in California v. Hodari D.,"5 in which the defendant's flight at
the approach of a police car prompted pursuit, in the course of which the
defendant discarded a small quantity of crack cocaine subsequently retrieved
by the police.56 The California court held that the officer's pursuit would
cause a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave, thus
balancing approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
5" Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996).
486 U.S. 567 (1988).
52 Id. at 574.
"3 Consent "is a particularly open concept, which refers to both an 'internal' state of
mind and an 'external' performance; consent is unequivocal and unquestioned only
when it includes both." Weinreb, supra note 25, at 55.
54 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991). "The narrow question before us is whether, with re-
spect to a show of authority ... a seizure occurs even though the subject does not
yield. We hold that it does not." Id. at 626.
M 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).
16 The lower court suppressed the cocaine as the fruit of the illegal seizure of Hodari
because there was no reasonable suspicion for pursuit. See In re Hodari D., 265 Cal.
Rptr. 79, 86 (App. Dist. Ct. 1989).
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satisfying the Mendenhall test for a Fourth Amendment seizure.57 The Su-
preme Court, however, held that no seizure occurs until a defendant actually
yields to the police due to his perception that he is not free to leave.5"
Unlike the Court in Mendenhall, which ignored the perceptions of the
actual defendant in favor of the perceptions of hypothesized people, Hodari
D. ignored the consideration of how such hypothesized people would,
should, or might react to an unwelcome encounter with the police. Instead,
the Court focused exclusively on the way a specific defendant actually re-
sponded to the police officer's show of authority. In Hodari D., the Court
justified its focus on the defendant's actions by invoking the common-law
definition of arrest: "An arrest requires either physical force ... or, where
that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority."59 If Mendenhall
reflects the Court's sphinx-like silence when choosing among various per-
spectives, Hodari D. offers little more than a confusing and unexplained
choice between common-law precedents.
The dissent in Hodari D. pointed out that Terry and Katz v. United
States" had expanded the constitutional definition of a seizure beyond
common-law concepts.6 The Hodari D. majority, however, insisted that the
dissent failed to grasp the distinction between seizures of property and sei-
zures of a person.
The dissent is correct that Katz v. United States, "unequivo-
cally reject[s] the notion that the common law of arrest de-
fines the limits of the term 'seizure' in the Fourth Amend-
ment."..... But we do not assert that it defines the limits of
the term "seizure"; only that it defines the limits of a seizure
of the person. What Katz stands for is the proposition that
items which could not be subject to seizure at common law
(e.g., telephone conversations) can be seized under the
Fourth Amendment. That is quite different from saying that
what constitutes an arrest (a seizure of the person) has
changed.62
5 See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629.
58 Hodari D. thus negated one of the justifications for the reasonable person test,
which "calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless
of the particular individual's response to the actions of the police." Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988). In contrast, the Court in Hodari D. focused "on
the suspect's subjective reaction, which an officer cannot possibly predict." Bruce A.
Green, Power, Not Reason, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373, 401 (1992).
5' Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
60 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61 The Court in Terry "concluded that the word 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment
encompasses official restraints on individual freedom that fall short of a common-law
arrest." Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 627 n.3 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). The essence of Katz
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In response, the dissent urged the majority to look "not to the common
law of arrest, but to the common law of attempted arrest,"63 which focuses
on the officer's subjective intent to apprehend the defendant.' The majori-
ty countered, however, that "neither usage nor common-law tradition makes
an attempted seizure a seizure. The common law may have made an at-
tempted seizure unlawful in certain circumstances; but it made many things
unlawful, very few of which were elevated to constitutional proscrip-
tions."65
The Hodari D. dissent's two-pronged effort to place attempted seizures
within the coverage of the Fourth Amendment was thwarted by the
majority's facility for using each prong to trump the other. Common-law
concepts of attempted arrests could not expand constitutional interpretation
of unreasonable seizures of the person; yet, at the same time, the common-
law concept of completed arrests constricted the Fourth Amendment prohibi-
tion against such seizures.'M Once again, the Court appeared to be hiding
the ball67 when it failed to identify the fundamental principle that led it to
is the Court's recognition that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places or
things. The Amendment thus protects items that are not subject to seizure at common
law because they might qualify as extensions of a person's protected privacy interests.
It is difficult to comprehend the way the Court can maintain that the Amendment pro-
tects extensions of the person (for example, conversations) against incorporeal intrusions
(for example, eavesdropping) but does not protect the person himself against such intru-
sions. If physical trespass is no longer the essence of Fourth Amendment seizures of
property, physical restraint should not be regarded as the benchmark for defining sei-
zures of the person. Once the Court recognizes that government action that falls short of
physical trespass can threaten privacy interests in personal items, it would seem axiom-
atic to claim that government action that falls short of physical restraint could threaten
personal liberty interests.
63 Id. at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The common law recognized that "an officer might be guilty of an assault be-
cause of an attempted arrest, without privilege, even if he did not succeed in touching
the other." Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201, 201 n.3
(1940); see also State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 1310 (Conn. 1992) ("The distinction
between an arrest and an attempted arrest at common law reflected the difference be-
tween battery and assault .... [W]e are persuaded that the dichotomy between an at-
tempted arrest and an arrest 'should not take on constitutional dimensions."') (quoting
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 631 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
65 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 n.2.
66 Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Hodari D., previously had
stated that the Fourth Amendment "should not become less than" the common law.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
Hodari D., Justice Scalia seemed to assert that the Fourth Amendment can never mean
more than the common law.
67 See Green, supra note 58, at 403-04.
Given the uncertainty of the relevant common-law analogue, one might again
suspect that the Court's decision was dictated by something other than the princi-
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adopt the common-law definition of a completed seizure while rejecting
common-law recognition of attempted seizures. If, as the Court in Michi-
gan v. Chesternut69 maintained, the reasonable person test was adopted to
ensure that Fourth Amendment protection "does not vary with the state of
mind of the particular individual being approached,"7 then why did Hodari
D. make Fourth Amendment protection contingent on the unpredictable re-
sponses of individual defendants?
3. The Police Officer's Perspective
If a defendant successfully navigates through the Court's use of the first
two perspectives-reasonable perceptions and actual submission-then he
must navigate a third perspective, that of the seizing officer. In Brower v.
Inyo County"' the Court stated:
It is clear.., that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not
occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination
of an individual's freedom of movement. . . , nor even
whenever there is a governmentally caused and
governmentally desired termination of an individual's free-
dom of movement. . . , but only when there is a govern-
mental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied.7 2
pie that common law determines the scope of the term 'seizure.' . .[. T]he Court
sounded a theme ... [that] the law should be fashioned to encourage cooperation
with law enforcement authorities. This consideration clearly explains the outcome
in Hodari D.; reliance on common law does not.
Id. (citation omitted).
Recognition of a common-law arrest as "the quintessential 'seizure of the person'
under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence," Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624, does not
mean that the Court must banish common-law prohibitions of attempted arrests to the
trash bin of peculiar historical practices that cannot be "elevated to constitutional pro-
scriptions." Id. at 626 n.2. After all, intrusion into residential dwellings is the
prototypical search specified in the Constitution. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 585-90 (1980). The Court, however, has extended Fourth Amendment coverage to
commercial premises, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967); automobiles,
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985); and quasi-public areas like telephone
booths, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
"' 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
7 Id. at 574.
7- 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
72 Id. at 596-97.
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The difficulty of translating this cumbersome language into a compre-
hensible third perspective is exacerbated by the Court's failure to clarify the
type of intent required of the officer. The facts of the Brower case were
classified as a seizure of the person because the suspect crashed into a po-
lice roadblock erected for the very purpose of stopping the suspect. 3 In
contrast, however, the Court explained that there was no seizure in Galas v.
McKee,74 in which a fleeing motorist lost control of his vehicle and crashed
during a high-speed chase by the police. In distinguishing the police intent
in Brower and Galas, Justice Scalia utilized a number of terms connoting a
subjective state of mind: for example, "willful" detention; results that are
"desired," "sought," and "meant;" and "designed" and "selected" means.75
Having authored an opinion replete with allusions to the police officer's
subjective state of mind, Justice Scalia then proclaimed that he did not think
it "practicable" to inquire into subjective intent.7 6 The concurring Justices
commended their colleague for avoiding inquiries into subjective intent, al-
though they questioned his introduction of the "concept of objective intent"
as a standard for determining Fourth Amendment seizures.' It is not clear,
however, that Justice Scalia was formulating a concept of objective intent in
Brower, because he neither employed the term in his majority opinion, nor
contested or endorsed the concurring opinion's use of the term. Again one
searches in vain for some explanation or precedent for the Court's focus on
this form of the officer's perspective. As one lower court lamented, "[t]he
reported cases all seem to look to subjective intent. However, the distinction
between subjective and objective intent was not in issue in any of those
cases."
78
The Court failed to clarify matters in its latest consideration of a police
officer's subjective intent. In Whren v. United States,79 the Justices were
asked to condemn pretext seizures, that is, situations in which objective facts
justify a seizure, but the police officer had actually seized the suspect as a
result of the officer's impermissible motives. The Court refused to condemn
pretext seizures because "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."8
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the ultimate decision in Whren,
the opinion lucidly addresses the distinction between objective facts upon
which a reasonable officer might have acted (a hypothetical construct) and
3 See id. at 599.
"' 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986), discussed in Brower, 489 U.S. at 595.
" Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-99.
76 See id. at 598.
Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78 Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
79 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
'° Id. at 1774.
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the subjective factors that in reality motivated an individual officer.8' In
contrast, Brower's distinction between subjective and objective intent re-
mains elusive because of the general understanding that the term "intent"
betokens an existing state of mind rather than a hypothetical construct. 2 To
make matters worse, Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinions in
both Brower and Whren, appeared to abandon efforts to define objective
intent83 while invoking a new phrase-"virtual subjectivity"-which he
disparagingly referred to as speculation "about the hypothetical reaction of a
hypothetical constable.
8 4
The Court's tendency to coin a new phrase to resolve each new or diffi-
cult case leaves the contours of objective intent, subjective intent, and virtu-
al subjectivity in doubt. At a minimum, however, it is clear that in Brower,
the Court adopted some form of the police officer's perspective; however,
the reason the Court chose this perspective remains enigmatic. The sole
justification the Court in Brower offered for focusing on the officer's intent
was the observation that "[tihe writs of assistance that were the principal
grievance against which the Fourth Amendment was directed ... did not
involve unintended consequences of government action." 85 The Court's
characterization of the writs of assistance controversy is accurate, but falsely
suggests that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment equated the reasonable-
ness of searches and seizures with the absence of malicious intent.8 6 The
Court's parsimonious reading of history ignores our nation's Founders'
desire for protection against both intentional misconduct by government
officials and the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.87 In a nation
81 See id. at 1774-76.
82 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After
Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 841 (1991) ("Brower demonstrates
that the intent to seize is measured objectively but does not specify how that is to be
done.").
83 During oral arguments in Hodari D., Justice Scalia "asked counsel what he
thought the words 'intentional acquisition of control' in [Brower] meant." [Arguments
Heard:] California v. Hodari D., 48 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3131 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1991).
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775.
85 Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (citations omitted).
816 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ("An officer's evil intentions
will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of
force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of
force constitutional.").
87 One of the most "odious features of writs of assistance [was] the unbridled discre-
tion given public officials to choose targets of the searches." Shirley M. Hufstedler,
Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Governmental Information Gath-
ering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (1979); see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of this Amendment ... is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental offi-
cials."); Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 417 ("A paramount purpose of the [F]ourth
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that cherishes the "right to be let alone,"'8 the Fourth Amendment compels
the Court to articulate constitutional standards that protect the individual
from arbitrary or intimidating police conduct, whatever the officer's actual
intent. The Brower opinion fails to persuade because it focuses on a specific
historical practice (writs of assistance) while refusing to address the funda-
mental purposes underlying the Fourth Amendment and the role that the
officer's perspective plays in furthering or frustrating those purposes.
In summary, the Court's seizure-of-the-person decisions in Mendenhall,
Hodari D., and Brower, evoke the rationale often given to the student who
questions why he or she received less than an "A" on his or her examina-
tion: "It's not that what was said is wrong, it's what wasn't said. The fault
lies in the failure to adequately address all aspects of the question."
B. Consensual Searches of Property
1. The Citizen's Perspective
The essence of the Mendenhall test for a seizure of the person is the
possibility of choice, that is, whether a reasonable person would have under-
stood that he or she was free to leave. The possibility of choice is also the
essence of determining a suspect's consent to a search of his or her proper-
ty, but here the choice must be that of the actual suspect, not a hypothetical
person. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,"9 all the Justices agreed that the de-
terminative factor was the citizen's subjective decision to consent to a
search of his property. 9 The only controversy in the case centered on
whether the citizen's "consent" must be a knowing and intelligent waiver of
the right to be free from unreasonable searches, or whether the consent need
only be voluntary in that there was no impermissible police coercion.9 The
Schneckloth majority concluded that the waiver standard was limited to
[A]mendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified
searches and seizures."); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment As a Device for
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1236 (1983) ("Virtually every signifi-
cant prerevolutionary search or seizure involved a nonspecific or arbitrarily obtained
warrant.").
88 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
89 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
9' "[A]ccount must be taken of ... the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person who consents." Id. at 229.
9' Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 66 (1989). Although writing
of the voluntariness of confessions, Professor Benner's observation applies equally to
voluntary consent to search. "The central teaching of Connelly [479 U.S. 157 (1986)] is
that voluntariness simply entails the absence of official coercion, and does not otherwise
require ethical conduct or fairness in dealing with the accused." Id.
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those constitutional rights that "protect a fair trial and the reliability of the
truth-determining process."92 The strict requirement for knowing and intel-
ligent waiver thus should not be applied to the Fourth Amendment because
its protections "have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascer-
tainment of truth at a criminal trial. 93
Having relegated the Fourth Amendment to less exalted status than those
constitutional rights serving truth and justice,94 the Court in Schneckloth
sought a less stringent standard for measuring consensual searches. The
appropriate standard conveniently was found in the Court's approach to the
voluntariness of confessions.95  As is the case with confessions,
voluntariness of a consent to search turns upon whether the consent is the
product of a person's free and unconstrained choice, or whether the will of
the individual searched was overborne and his capacity for self-determina-
tion critically impaired. 96 With respect to both confessions and searches,
voluntariness thus is determined by examining the totality of the circum-
stances, including a defendant's personal characteristics.
The Court's decision in Schneckloth to substitute voluntariness for
knowing waiver, and the Court's refusal to extend Miranda-style warnings
to the Fourth Amendment,97 is revisited in Part II of this Article.9" Justice
9 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236.
9' Id. at 242. The dominance of the exclusionary rule in Schneckloth was even more
apparent in Justice Powell's concurring opinion, which sought to limit the Court's habe-
as corpus review of Fourth Amendment violations. See id. at 250 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell maintained that federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amend-
ment violations did not serve "the central reason for habeas corpus: the affording of
means, through an extraordinary writ, of redressing an unjust incarceration.... Prison-
ers raising Fourth Amendment claims collaterally usually are quite justly detained." Id.
at 257-58 (Powell, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting) ("We cannot give some constitutional rights a preferred position without rele-
gating others to a deferred position; we can establish no firsts without thereby establish-
ing seconds. Indications are not wanting that Fourth Amendment freedoms are tacitly
marked as secondary rights, to be relegated to a deferred position.").
'9 "The most extensive judicial exposition of the meaning of 'voluntariness' has
been developed in those cases in which the Court has had to determine the
'voluntariness' of a defendant's confession for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223.
See id. at 225.
According to the Court in Schneckloth, the basis for the Miranda decision "was
the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself." Id. at 240. Although borrowing freely
from the Court's confession cases, the Court in Schneckloth refused to follow the pro-
gression of that line of cases to Miranda. A defendant's subjective knowledge of a right
to refuse consent is thus one relevant circumstance in determining voluntary consent,
but "knowledge of a right to refuse is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent." Id. at
234.
9 See infra text accompanying note 147.
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Marshall's dissent in Schneckloth pointed to one underlying theme that
might guide the Court's choice of perspectives when interpreting the Fourth
Amendment. According to Justice Marshall: "The Constitution guaran-
tees.., a society of free choice. Such a society presupposes the capacity of
its members to choose, . . . [and] the capacity to choose necessarily depends
upon knowledge that there is a choice to be made."99 Even without Justice
Marshall's endorsement of a broad right to free choice, Schneckloth remains
the high-water mark for judicial adoption of the citizen's perspective be-
cause all the Justices agreed that the citizen's subjective state of mind
should govern consensual searches of property.1" In Schneckloth, however,
the Court foreshadowed its inability to maintain a focus on the defendant's
subjective perspective by suggesting that "a 'waiver' approach to consent
searches would be thoroughly inconsistent with our decisions that have ap-
proved 'third-party consents.......
2. A Third Party's Perspective
As Schneckloth suggests, the issue of third-party consent is paradoxical
if conceived of as one person waiving another person's constitutional
rights.102 The third-party consent cases that troubled the Court in
Schneckloth, however, were only tangentially related to a third party's per-
spective. Two of those cases, Chapman v. United States °3 and Stoner v.
California,"° stand for the unsurprising proposition that landlords and ho-
tel clerks (or other third parties with limited property-law claims to the
9 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in
the result)).
"o The Court's focus on voluntariness in Schneckloth was reaffirmed in Ohio v.
Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
101 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 245.
102 "To conclude that a [F]ourth [A]mendment right to privacy may be lost because a
person with no or little stake in the outcome decides to throw it away is bizarre." Dan-
iel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175,
180 (1991).
103 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961) (explaining that vesting the landlord with authority to
consent "would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave [tenants'] homes
secure only in the discretion of [landlords]") (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
- 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) ("It is important to bear in mind that it was the
petitioner's constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night clerk's nor
the hotel's. It was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by word or
deed, either directly or through an agent."). The Court in Stoner also discounted the
police officer's perspective because "there [was] nothing in the record to indicate that
the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been authorized
by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner's room." Id.
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premises being searched) cannot consent to a search of their tenants' resi-
dences. The remaining third-party consent case, Frazier v. Cupp," is
inconsistent with a waiver theory, but it is best viewed as a precursor to the
Court's shift toward the police officer's perspective. In Frazier, the
defendant's cousin consented to the search of a duffel bag owned by the
defendant but jointly used by both the defendant and the cousin. Despite this
mutual access to the duffel bag, the defendant informed the Court that the
cousin had permission to use only one compartment of the bag and thus
lacked authority to consent to a search of the other compartments in which
the incriminating evidence was found. The Court ridiculed this contention as
a "metaphysical subtlety" and stated that the defendant "must be taken to
have assumed the risk that [the cousin] would allow someone else to look
inside. '' "°
Frazier is a case that cries out for consideration of the officer's perspec-
tive. A reasonable officer, dealing with what appears to be a simple duffel
bag, would have had no way of knowing about the secret subjective limita-
tions on the suspect's apparently total control of the bag. It is in this sense
that the defendant's argument becomes a metaphysical subtlety contrasting
secret subjective intentions with objective manifestations of control. Frazier
would have been an easy decision if the Court had been prepared to apply
the officer's perspective, but it would take another twenty years before the
Court would do so.a
Frazier was not a mere misstep on the Court's path to adopting the
police perspective. Frazier and subsequent third-party consent cases actually
reinforced the citizen perspective (so long as one discards the Court's super-
ficial reference to assumption of risk). In theory and practice, third-party
consent does not rest upon an explicit or implicit delegation of authority by
defendants who, as a general rule, never pondered the possibility or risk of a
third-party sanctioning a search or seizure." The proper justification for
such consent is the third party's independent right to admit police to proper-
05 In Chapman, the government argued that, by using his rented house as an illegal
distillery, the defendant "forfeited" his rights as a tenant; thus the landlord had a com-
mon-law right to enter and to bring police officers with him. See Chapman, 365 U.S. at
616.
10M 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
107 Id. at 740.
1o8 See infra text accompanying note 115.
""9 The clearest case of third-party consent would be a situation in which the defen-
dant explicitly authorized an agent to consent to a search. Fourth Amendment rights
may be waived "by word or deed, either directly or through an agent." Stoner, 376 U.S.
at 489. It is not surprising that the Court has never encountered such a case "because
people living agreeably together usually do not arrive at explicit, regular practices; they
proceed by understandings that are most satisfactory if they are imprecise, flexible, and
unstated." Weinreb, supra note 25, at 63.
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ty that he or she jointly controls. As United States v. Matlock. ° subse-
quently recognized, "any of the co-inhabitants [of a residence] has the right
to permit the inspection in his own right ....
In third-party consent cases, the proper question for the Court is whether
the third party "possessed common authority over or other sufficient rela-
tionship to the premises" ' so that command over admitting the police
necessarily. accompanies such control. In short, the landlord and hotel clerk
in Chapman and Stoner did not have this power, while the co-inhabitant in
Matlock did. One may quibble over the degree of control that necessarily
conveys authority to admit the police, but this is a legal question for the
Court, not a choice consciously or unconsciously made by the defen-
dant."3 Assumption of risk is thus a pure fiction masquerading as a con-
cern for the defendant's perspective. Once the Court recognizes that a cer-
tain degree of lawful physical control vests a third person with authority to
admit the police, the Court may apply the third party's perspective notwith-
standing the defendant's wishes. For example, if two co-tenants fully control
access to shared premises, each may admit anyone. In so doing, one tenant
is not waiving the rights of the other, but merely is exercising his own pow-
er to do as he or she pleases with the property. Viewed in this light, third-
party consent does not involve a separate and distinct perspective. It is still
the citizen's perspective, though it is not the citizen who ultimately winds
up as the criminal defendant.
3. The Police Officer's Perspective
After ignoring the police officer's perspective in Frazier, and expressly
reserving ruling on the issue in United States v. Matlock,"4 the Court
adopted the police officer's perspective in Illinois v. Rodriguez"5 by up-
holding a search based on apparent authority as viewed from the officer's
standpoint. The consent in Rodriguez was given by a woman who referred
to the defendant's apartment as "our" apartment, and who informed the
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
I Id. at 171 n.7 (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 170.
"' The relationship between the consenter, the defendant, and the areas searched is
not a factual question, but "an inherently legal one." United States v. Kim, 105 F.3d
1579, 1581 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 844 (9th
Cir. 1986)). An appellate court thus conducts a de novo review in order "to 'consider
abstract legal doctrines, to weigh underlying policy considerations, and to balance com-
peting legal interests."' Id. (quoting Hamilton, 792 F.2d at 844 (quoting United States v.
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824
(1984))).
114 415 U.S. at 178 n.14.
-' 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
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police that she had clothes and furniture there. In fact, the woman had va-
cated the apartment a month before the search, and the Court conceded that
she had no actual authority over the premise. Nonetheless, the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment does not require factual accuracy on the part of
the police."
6
The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth
Amendment is to impose a standard of "reasonableness"
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials. The
only basis for contending that the constitutional standard
could not possibly have been met here is the argument that
reasonableness must be judged by the facts as they were,
rather than by the facts as they [appeared to the officer]." 7
Rodriguez's endorsement of the police viewpoint reflects the Court's emerg-
ing view of the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment: What is
demanded of police "is not that they always be correct, but that they always
be reasonable.""1
8
The Court reinforced this emphasis on the reasonable officer's perspec-
tive in Florida v. Jimeno,"9 in which the officer's perception of appear-
ances was extended beyond third-party consent situations and applied to the
scope of consent given by the defendant. In Jimeno, the defendant consented
to a search of his vehicle, but the lower court ruled that the consent did not
extend to the officer's separate act of opening a container found within the
vehicle. 2 According to the trial court, "if the police wish to search closed
containers within a car they must separately request permission to search
each container."'' The Supreme Court, however, found this approach to
be in conflict with "the Fourth Amendment's basic test of objective reason-
ableness,"'2 which Jimeno referred to as "the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment."'2 The Court held that "the standard for measuring the scope
of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective'
reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood
11 See id. at 185.
17 Id. at 186 n.1 (emphasis added).
118 Id. at 185.
500 U.S. 248 (1991).
120 See State v. Jimeno, 550 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (declaring that
consent to a general search for narcotics does not extend to sealed containers within the
general area agreed to by the defendant).
21 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 250.
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by the exchange?"'' As in Rodriguez, what is demanded of police "is not
that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable."'"
Rodriguez's and Jimeno's endorsement of the police officer's perspec-
tive rests upon the Court's use of the word "reasonable" in two distinct
manners. The Court used reasonableness as a term of art synonymous with
constitutionality, and, at the same time, a description of the searching
officer's rational analysis of the situation. This approach conceptualizes the
Fourth Amendment as a limited guarantee that although "subjective good-
faith belief would not in itself justify"' 6 a governmental intrusion upon
individual privacy, at least some searches and seizures are constitutional
when based on "understandable," excusable mistakes by the police; 7
however, the history of the Fourth Amendment teaches that constitutionality
hinges on more than individual ad hoc decisions, no matter how reasonable,
understandable, or excusable they may have appeared to the searching offi-
cer. The full implications of this and other views of the Fourth Amendment,
and their effect on choosing perspectives, are considered in the next section.
II. A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO CHOOSING PERSPECTIVES
When setting out to structure a principled process for judicial adoptions
of interpretive perspectives, the first question that arises is: At what level of
generality should the Court operate?"2 Should the Court settle on some
fundamental constitutional principle that favors a particular perspective?
Should the Court even concern itself with consistency, foolish or otherwise,
when choosing among various perspectives? One solution to such broad
questions is to abandon them in favor of a narrower, pragmatic approach
that merely asks which perspective works best in each unique situation. In
other words, instead of judging legal principles according to their logical
consistency, "it is much more important to study their social operation and
the effects which they produce."' 29 This form of pragmatic utilitar-
ianism 3' discounts any inherent value in favoring the viewpoint of a citi-
zen, police officer, or hypothetical person, because these perspectives are
'2 Id. at 250-51.
125 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185.
126 Id.
127 Id. (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987)).
"s "The question remains at what level of generality and in what shape rules should
be designed in order to encompass all that can be encompassed without throwing orga-
nization to the wolves." Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 377.
129 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 514 (1912).
130 See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555 (1996) (compar-
ing legal formalism with pragmatism).
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seen merely as tools to be utilized in serving the public welfare as perceived
from a broad social perspective. Pragmatic utilitarianism propels the Court
to the forefront, where it decides what is best for society without deferring
to other decision makers.
A. Pragmatic Utilitarianism from the Court's Perspective
Nineteenth-century legal formalism dominated American judicial'thought
when the Supreme Court encountered its first important Fourth Amendment
case, Boyd v. United States.' Legal formalism in its most rigorous mani-
festation espoused the view that adjudication proceeds by deduction from
virtually absolute legal principles rooted in natural law and enshrined in
both the common law and the Constitution. Pursuant to this view, constitu-
tional rights and the rules enforcing them were to be "applied rigorously
even if this produced results that conflicted with important social goals, such
as efficient law enforcement."'' Legal formalism led the Court to con-
clude in Boyd that the Fourth Amendment is to provide absolute protection
of private papers no matter how reasonably the government were to proceed
in obtaining a warrant or subpoena satisfying the probable cause and partic-
ularity requirements of the Amendment.'33
By the time the Court encountered a sizable body of search-and-seizure
cases during the prohibition era, legal formalism came under heavy attack
from the more pragmatic and relativist vision of law associated with the
legal realists. The legal realists derided formalism's pretensions of objectivi-
ty, while insisting that the Court must weigh social policies and assess all
the facts and circumstances of a case in order to determine the most just or
socially desirable outcome." This relativistic debate over sound social
policy came to the forefront when the issue of government wiretapping
arose in Olmstead v. United States.35
In eloquent language that appeals to Americans as diverse as laissez-
faire business men and paramilitary cults, Justice Brandeis's dissent in
Olmstead put forth Brandeis's view of the contribution the Fourth Amend-
ment makes to our society:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
131 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
132 See Cloud, supra note 130, at 566.
133 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35.
134 "The Fourth Amendment is to be construed ... in a manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interest and rights of individual citizens." Carroll v. Unit-
ed States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
.3' 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, plea-
sure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjusti-
fiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment."3
Justice Holmes, who was at times another leading proponent of legal real-
ism, straightforwardly confessed that he approached the issue in Olmstead
by balancing the "two objects of desire ... that criminals should be detect-
ed ... [and] that the Government should not itself foster and pay for other
crimes. ' For Holmes, it was "less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an ignoble part."' 38
Much of modern-day constitutional jurisprudence has embraced the type
of pragmatic interest balancing championed by Justices Brandeis and
Holmes. The most militant of today's pragmatists reject the notion that
individual rights can trump social policies, and instead insist that constitu-
tional rights must justify themselves in terms of their contribution to total
social welfare.'39 The Fourth Amendment, because of its socially costly
136 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
138 Id. Perhaps the most revealing description of this pragmatic approach is Justice
Cardozo's merger of the legislative and judicial functions:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic, and
history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct, are
forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law. Which of
these forces shall dominate in any case, must depend largely upon the compara-
tive importance or value of the social interests that will thereby be promoted or
impaired .... If you ask how [the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs
another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator
gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. Here,
indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator's work and [the judge's].
The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in the end be guided by
like considerations for the one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating within
the limits of his competence.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921).
'39 "[T]he undeniable message is that those calling for greater protection of a 'right'
had better be prepared to explain how the protection benefits not only the individual
claimant but all of society." Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Priva-
cy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1765
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"remedy" of suppressing relevant evidence, has suffered most from this
form of pragmatic interest balancing. 4' Handicapped by the current
Court's hostility to the harmful effects of the exclusionary rule, Boyd's
formalistic view of the Fourth Amendment has given way to "consequential
reasoning that emphasizes not individual rights but the instrumental use of
the law to achieve social and government policy goals.'' Balancing com-
peting societal interests such as crime prevention and deterrence of police
misconduct thus has emerged as the keynote of the Court's interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment. 142
In the past few decades, judicial attempts to balance individual rights
against community interests have tended to ride roughshod over the
individual's perspective.'43 The Jimeno majority, for example, adopted the
officer's perception that he had a broad grant of authority to search the
defendant's vehicle because "the community has a real interest in encourag-
ing consent."'" In turn, encouraging consent serves the laudable social
goal of protecting the innocent, "for the resulting search may yield neces-
sary evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may
insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal
offense."'45 In dissent, however, Justice Marshall saw a far different social
policy at work because he viewed adoption of the police officer's perspec-
tive as encouraging the police to exploit "the ignorance of a citizen.,'1
46
Justice Marshall rejected the Jimeno majority's view of what was in the
community's interest and the type of community the Fourth Amendment
seeks to preserve:
(1994).
140 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973) (holding that Fourth Amendment issues may not be raised in federal habeas
corpus petitions unless the state denied the defendant a full and fair hearing on the
issue). Stone and Schneckloth present the most striking examples of the way the Court
has relegated the Fourth Amendment, and its socially costly exclusionary rule, to some
lower class of constitutional rights. The Court has not provided this class of rights with
the deference reserved for constitutional rights that further truth, justice, and the Ameri-
can way.
141 Cloud, supra note 130, at 598.
142 "[T]he balancing of competing interests [is] the key principle of the Fourth
Amendment." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
143 See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 202 (1993) ("Fourth Amendment pragmatism produces
outcomes that diminish the scope of individual liberty while increasing government
power .... ").
144 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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[T]he majority is claiming that "the community has a real
interest" not in encouraging citizens to consent to investiga-
tory efforts of their law enforcement agents, but rather in
encouraging individuals to be duped by them. This is not the
community that the Fourth Amendment contemplates." 7
Today, those who advocate Justice Marshall's concern for individual
rights "must address why, in a world plagued by terrorism, drug cartels, and
drive-by-killings, the Court's definition of 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' should not give deference to heightened law enforcement
needs .... .""' The preordained failure of such advocacy is obvious in
such cases as Pennsylvania v. Mimms'49 and Maryland v. Wilson,'s in
which the Court was asked to rule on a police practice of ordering all mo-
torists out of their vehicles "as a matter of course whenever they had been
stopped for a traffic violation.' 51 In Mimms and Wilson, the Court ad-
dressed this uniform practice without inquiring whether the individual police
officer had any suspicion that the particular motorist was likely to be armed
and dangerous.5 5 The Court concluded that uniform treatment of motorists
as a class was justified by statistical evidence "that a significant percentage
of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic
stops.'" s3 Regardless of the particular facts of a given case, the generalized
'"' Id. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The same type of conflicting views of the
good society and the pragmatic way to achieve it are apparent in the Court's refusal in
Schneckloth to graft Miranda-style warnings onto the Fourth Amendment because such
warnings were "thoroughly impractical." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231. Justice Marshall
again saw the issue differently:
When the Court speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued
ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish
by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relin-
quishment of constitutional rights.
Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148 Sundby, supra note 139, at 1771.
149 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
150 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
151 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; see also Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
152 See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109; Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886. The state conceded in
Mimms that "the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the particular driver at
the time of the stop, there having been nothing unusual or suspicious about his behav-
ior." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109; see also Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
153 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; see also Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 883. This time it was
Justice Stevens who contended that the majority's view in Mimms was not faithful to
the community that the Fourth Amendment contemplates: "[W]hether viewed from the
standpoint of the officer's interest in his own safety, or of the citizen's interest in not
being required to obey an arbitrary command, it is perfectly obvious that the millions of
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governmental interest in protecting police from attack by armed motorists
was deemed to outweigh the generalized privacy interest of motorists as a
class. 154
Whether dealing with a class of the citizenry such as motorists, or an
individual citizen confronted by a solitary police officer, the Court employs
the same pragmatic balancing of governmental and individual interests to
resolve all Fourth Amendment issues.1" Taken to its logical end, the
Court's pragmatic utilitarianism reduces all Fourth Amendment deliberations
to two related fundamental inquiries: (1) How much and what type of priva-
cy or liberty does a reasonably free society require, and (2) how much and
what type of intrusion upon privacy or liberty is required to further a rea-
sonably well-ordered society?' If the Court must grapple with such ques-
traffic stops that occur every year are not fungible." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 120-21
(Stevens, J., dissenting). To Justice Stevens, the majority's willingness to manipulate
individual motorists for the general good of society fulfilled the legal realists' view that
"the law does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an end .... [J]ustice to
the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the
scales." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 40-41 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
" Cf Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997) (rejecting a per se rule that
would eliminate the need for knock and notice in all felony drug investigations).
[W]hile drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and
the preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to
a substantial degree.... If a per se exception were allowed for each category of
criminal investigation that included a considerable-albeit hypothetical-risk of
danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.
Id. at 1421.
' "The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for
the particular search against the invasion of the personal rights that the search entails."
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (emphasis added). Balancing "has the danger
of becoming a sort of universal solvent, operating as a technique for resolving all con-
stitutional questions without much regard for the choices authoritatively expressed in the
language of that document itself." James White, The Fourth Amendment As a Way of
Talking about People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 165, 171.
156 "[T]he practical calculus evident in the search and seizure corpus is to decide how
much individual liberty is compatible with the social interest in security." Gerard V.
Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 817,
859 (1989); see also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(noting that the Constitution and Bill of Rights can be seen as "the maximum restric-
tions upon the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with
the maintenance of organized society itself"); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13
(1966) (claiming that issues raised under the Fourth Amendment "bring into sharp focus
the classic dilemma of order vs. liberty in the democratic state").
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tions in order to formulate a grand scheme for the good society, 5 ' it
seems almost impertinent to point out that the Court has neglected the issue
of choosing perspectives and has been inconsistent in the choices that it has
made. Understandably, the Court is concerned primarily with the far weight-
ier criticism of the undemocratic nature of judicial utilitarianism. Told by
countless commentators that the Court has no legitimate claim to making
moral and political decisions based on its conception of a good society,5 '
it is not surprising that the Court has thrown up its hands and confessed:
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only
the general standard of "unreasonableness" as a guide in
determining whether searches and seizures meet the standard
of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant is not re-
quired. Very little that has been said in our previous deci-
sions ... and very little that we might say here can usefully
refine the language of the Amendment itself in order to
evolve some detailed formula for judging cases such as
this.159
One certainly can empathize with the Court's frustration when called
upon to justify whether its decisions meaningfully contribute to building a
utopia." After all, professors can ignore tough cases or postpone mean-
ingful consideration until the next sabbatical, but the Court must decide real
cases that affect real people.'6 ' Forced to act in an imperfect world, the
Court is understandably tempted to pass on its burden to others. 62 As Pro-
"5 One rather strident comment on the death of legal formalism and the rise of legal
realism contended: "No longer could the judiciary hide behind the facade of essentially
indeterminate deductions from so-called absolute moral principles in order to force upon
society its own values and thereby obstruct progress toward maximum social efficien-
cy." Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 966 (1977).
15 "The presence of the word 'unreasonable' in the text of the Fourth Amendment
does not grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth
Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the social good." New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 370 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973).
"6 See John B. Mitchell, What Went Wrong with the Warren Court's Conception of
the Fourth Amendment?, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 35, 42-43 (1992) (suggesting that the
Court must rethink the Amendment in terms of keeping with some basic vision of
America).
161 "Authority cannot be conceded to persons because they are right-the authority
must preexist their right or wrong judgment and must survive it too-and judges decide
cases by virtue of their authority, and not because they are any more likely to be right
than other people." Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the
Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 761 (1963).
162 "[G]iven the magnitude of the type of societal problems that governmental intru-
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fessor Tribe suggested, "[a]bdicating responsibility for choice, then, is a
characteristic sin of the current Court.' ' 63 At times, the Court's burden has
been passed to police, hypothetical reasonable people, or individual citizens,
whose perspectives are utilized to resolve Fourth Amendment issues.
B. Reasonableness from the Police Officer's Perspective
If the Court merits our compassion as it grapples with molding the law
to serve society, the police are entitled to our commiseration when they
confront an increasingly violent class of criminal in modern-day America.
For example, an officer's sense of danger during street encounters may be
both real and accurate, yet difficult to reconstruct and articulate in some
concrete fashion.
We have all seen people so hard or mean in appearance that
they make us feel uncomfortable, perhaps to the point of
crossing the street or moving our seat on the subway. We
have confidence in such judgments, and act on them our-
selves, yet how could we explain them in a court of law?
How can we ask an officer to do so?' 6
In an imperfect world where correct answers are uncertain, a "pragmatic"
Court recognizes that it must muddle through to the best of its ability, and
that it can hardly ask more from the police. Thus, the Court often deter-
mines the constitutionality of police conduct "by resorting to a malleable
'objective' test of reasonableness viewed from the police officer's perspec-
tive,"165 and "any police conduct that is 'understandable' in the circum-
sions will address-such as weapons possession, drunk driving, drug use, and gang
activity-judicial review increasingly will defer to the government's judgment that the
intrusion was necessary." Sundby, supra note 139, at 1768-69. -
163 Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 170 (1984).
'" White, supra note 155, at 199.
16 Cloud, supra note 143, at 265; see also Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the War-
rant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 477
(1991):
Although the [F]ourth [A]mendment conveys to "the People [the right] to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," the reasonableness approach
focuses on the acts of the police instead of the rights of the people. The question,
then, becomes whether the police acted reasonably rather than whether a person's
rights were violated. This approach endorses retrospective evaluations of police
behavior rather than prospective protections.
(footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV.).
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stances according to common sense [will] be judged 'reasonable' for pur-
poses of assessing the constitutionality of police intrusions."' ,
Although the Court's adoption of the officer's viewpoint is defensible,
once again one may ask for a fuller explanation of the way the Court chose
this perspective. Why did the Court choose to empathize with the officer's
plight while turning a deaf ear to citizens of Spanish descent who were
singled out at roadblocks,'67 or to international travelers who were held
incommunicado for twenty-four hours in a "dry cell" until they furnished a
bowel sample?'68 The distasteful answer may be that in the actual cases
that reach the Court, the defendants usually are guilty of some serious
crime. The obvious guilt of the balloon-swallowing drug smuggler in United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez,'69 allowed the Court to brush aside the
defendant's twenty-four hour confinement in a "dry cell" by noting that the
"detention was long, uncomfortable, indeed, humiliating; but both its length
and its discomfort resulted solely from the method by which she chose to
smuggle illicit drugs into this country. '  Does the Court's choice of per-
spective really come down to sorting out the good guys from the bad guys
in each case? If so, the Fourth Amendment is in deeper trouble than previ-
ously recognized because the champions of our Fourth Amendment rights
are often the least sympathetic characters in existence.17" ' If Fourth Amend-
ment cases turn on the relative blameworthiness of police and defendants,
cynics are correct in suggesting that the inconsistency in the Court's reason-
ing disappears when the true unifying principle is recognized-the govern-
ment wins!'
166 Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v.
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exag-
gerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1991); see, e.g.,
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) ("[C]ourts should not invalidate
the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense,
manner.").
167 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
161 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
169 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
170 Id. at 544.
171 "It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequent-
ly been forged in controversies involving not very nice people." United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "One who would de-
fend the Fourth Amendment must share his foxhole with scoundrels of every sort, but
to abandon the post because of the poor company is to sell freedom cheaply." Kopf v.
Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 379-80 (4th Cir. 1993).
1 "If the Court can identify any plausible goal or reason that promotes law enforce-
ment interests, the challenged police intrusion is considered reasonable and the constitu-
tional inquiry is over." Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 200 (1993).
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In its rush to condemn the guilty, the Court has overlooked the fact that
the standards it has fashioned to govern the ferreting out of the guilty apply
equally to the detention of the innocent. Empirical data indicates that the
sins of the few weigh heavily on the blameless. According to the dissent in
Montoya, "[o]ne physician who at the request of customs officials conducted
many 'internal searches'-rectal and vaginal examinations and stomach
pumping--estimated that he had found contraband in only 15 to 20 percent
of the persons he had examined.""' Other estimates suggested that "only
16 percent of women subjected to body-cavity searches at the border were
in fact found to be carrying contraband."'74
The ability to look beyond the obvious guilt of a particular defendant
requires judicial foresight, discipline, and courage, and it may be impossible
for judges to completely ignore the severity of the crime committed by a
defendant.'75 At a minimum, judges are painfully aware of the tension be-
tween protecting rights and knowing that some will abuse those rights and
act irresponsibly.
The First Amendment is the constitutional shelter for pro-
gressive visionaries, but it is also the refuge of those who
preach hatred. And while the Fourth Amendment erects a
barrier from government intrusion for those who wish to live
peacefully, it is also a barrier behind which the drug smug-
gler will try to hide.176
In a society simultaneously fearful of crime and resentful of "jack-booted"
government authorities, there is no avoiding the inevitable tension between
security against the government and security that depends on government
efforts to control crime.
In the final analysis, however, even the guilty are entitled to protection
against overbearing government intrusions, and to some extent we must take
the Court at its word that it strives to "prevent hindsight from coloring the
evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure."' 77 What then, oth-
173 Montoya, 473 U.S. at 557 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174 Id.
17 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting):
I should candidly strive hard to sustain [a roadblock without probable cause] ...
because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the
only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not
strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of
bourbon and catch a bootlegger.
176 Sundby, supra note 140, at 1808.
177 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976); see also United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (A Fourth Amendment entry of a home can-
not "be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does
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er than the coiparative moral worth of police and criminal defendants,
motivates the Court to adopt the police officer's perspective? Professor
LaFave has suggested that Fourth Amendment doctrine
is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-
day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that
are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law
enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged.
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nu-
ances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady
stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges
eagerly feed, but they may be "literally impossible of appli-
cation by the officer in the field." '78
At times, the Court has embraced Professor LaFave's approach by announc-
ing that "the first principle" of Fourth Amendment interpretation is that the
constitutional standard must be "workable for application by rank-and-file,
trained police officers;" ' however, formulating rules that are clear in ap-
plication says little about the substance of those rules.' "Don't search on
Thursdays" is a clear rule furthering privacy interests; "search all teenagers
who are in public after 11 p.m." is a clear rule diminishing privacy. Does
the Fourth Amendment have nothing to say about the desirability of these
equally clear rules? Once the Court settles on the conditions under which a
search or seizure may occur, we would all hope that the Court will be as
lucid as possible in defining the contours of such reasonable searches. This
is as fundamental as mom and apple pie; the police are not unique in prefer-
ring clarity over ambiguity.' If, however, clarity is all that the police
want, one very clear rule would be "when in doubt, don't search," or at
not change character from its success.").
178 Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Proce-
dures:" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. Cr. REV. 127, 141 (citations omitted).
179 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 (1983).
i'o Professor LaFave did not advocate clarity as the sole or dominant consideration,
but instead argued that clarity plays a role in the calculus of balancing government and
individual interests. He suggested that a rule, theoretically correct only 95% of the time,
but understandable in virtually all cases, is preferable to a rule that is 100% theoretical-
ly correct, but which police could apply correctly only 75% of the time. See Wayne
LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the
"Quagmire," 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 30 n.76 (1972).
181 "[A] body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains
is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the
grounds for desiring that end are- stated or are ready to be stated in words." OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 186 (1920).
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least don't search until the doubt is resolved. This was the essence of the
lower court's holding in Jimeno that police cannot open containers found in
a defendant's automobile unless they obtain permission to search not just
the vehicle, but the particular container.'82 The Supreme Court, however,
rejected this clear rule in favor of an uncertain inquiry into how a reason-
able officer might interpret permission to search an automobile.
The Court's vacillation between vague and well-defined standards'83
may stem from its realization that the quest for clearly stated, determinative
rules is futile. "[A]ny attempt to achieve certainty regarding any important
constitutional issue is unlikely to succeed and--even if it does succeed in
the short run-will inevitably create uncertainty as to more issues than it
settles."'" For example, in Hodari D.,"85 the Court sought to make the
constitutional criteria for seizures of the person contingent upon factual
predicates that police officers can readily understand-submission to author-
ity or physical touching. In Hodari D., the Court announced a seemingly
absolute rule that a seizure may be "accomplished by merely touching,
however slightly, the body of the accused .... ""' However, in the very
next seizure-of-a-person case, Florida v. Bostick,"7 the Court was asked to
apply this absolute rule to a situation in which the police officer "physically
touched the defendant's foot to get his attention."' 8 The Bostick opinion's
failure to address this contention suggests that the "absolute rule" announced
in Hodari D. had been modified to recognize that certain forms of touching
are insufficient for a seizure.8 9
The inability to formulate clear rules for addressing the myriad of situ-
ations in which police intrude upon privacy and security increasingly leads
the Court to adopt one overarching rule for the police; just use your com-
mon sense and act reasonably. As formulated in Terry v. Ohio, the standard
is whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
182 See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
..3 See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 22 (1988) (illustrating that the Court has failed
to explain why it sometimes uses balancing and sometimes uses rigid rules).
" Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 1, 2 (1986).
18 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
186 Id. at 625 (quoting A. CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 163-64 (2d ed. 1930)).
187 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
188 [Arguments Heard:] Florida v. Bostick, 48 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3161, 3163
(U.S. Mar. 6, 1991).
18 See United States v. Burrell, 286 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1972) (holding that physi-
cal contact is acceptable if it is "a normal means of attracting a person's attention"); see
also United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that an officer who
placed his hand on a defendant's back for two or three seconds effected a seizure, but
not an arrest).
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the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action
taken was appropriate.' 90 In Terry however, the Court was misguided in
its suggestion that a police officer could strike the constitutionally appropri-
ate balance between conflicting governmental and privacy interests by em-
ploying a common-sense, seat-of-the-pants assessment.' 9' The Court's en-
dorsement of the police officer's perspective in Terry rests upon using the
word "reasonable" as a term of art synonymous with constitutionality, and,
at the same time, a description of the searching officer's rational analysis of
the situation. By equating reasonableness as a process of logical thought
with reasonableness as a standard of constitutionally permissible behavior,
the protections of the Fourth Amendment are reduced to a prohibition
against irrational police actions. As Justice Stevens recently charged, the
Court acts "on the assumption that the constitutional protection against
'unreasonable' seizures requires nothing more than a hypothetically rational
basis for intrusions on individual liberty.' ' 192
If taken seriously, adoption of the police perspective is "an invitation to
reviewing courts to treat a police intrusion as 'reasonable' if any explanation
for the police conduct can be given."'93 This approach admittedly requires
something more than whimsy or caprice by police officers, 94 but even a
five-percent likelihood that seizable items are present in the place to be
searched would establish that the basis for the search is rational and not
wholly arbitrary. Allowing police to act on such minimal suspicion, howev-
er, would lead to an unacceptable number of unnecessarily invasive and
harassing searches and seizures. The cost to the victims of such unnecessary
1-o 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
191 The Court's statement in Terry regarding a belief "that the action taken was ap-
propriate," id. at 22, is a meaningless generality to the police officer on the street. See
Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and
Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 64 (1968). In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981),
the Court eschewed balancing based on the particular facts and adopted a "single famil-
iar standard" to guide police officers because officers "have only limited time and ex-
pertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the spe-
cific circumstances they confront." Id. at 458.
Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 890 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3 Davies, supra note 166, at 57; see also Sundby, supra note 139, at 1769 (arguing
that importing balancing into the Fourth Amendment shifted "control from the individu-
al over the 'facts' justifying the government's power to intrude (by not engaging in
behavior giving rise to probable cause) to the government's ability to forge a
'reasonable' policy justification"). Some lower courts have taken the Supreme Court at
its word and have concluded that the Fourth Amendment requires only "some basis
from which the court can determine that the [intrusion] was not arbitrary or harassing."
Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966).
" See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985) (acknowl-
edging that customs inspectors had more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspi-
cion or hunch") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
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intrusions is obvious, but the state also has an economic interest because
"[the lower the level of certainty required for a search and seizure, the
more state resources will be wasted in conducting it, since more mistakes
will occur."'95
Deferring to an officer's exercise of common sense also conflicts with
the Court's view that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard
requires a delicate balance between the government interest and the individ-
ual interest in privacy or liberty. The very idea of balancing implies that
each side has some merit, that some privacy interests outweigh some gov-
ernment interests, and that all forms of privacy cannot be set aside merely
because the government offers a modicum of rational justification for an
intrusion. All searches are not equal; thus, "[t]he more intrusive an investi-
gative technique is, the more assured we want to be that it will result in the
discovery of probative evidence before we allow the police to undertake
it."'96 Determining which justifications are sufficient for which types of
intrusions requires something other than ostensibly value-free objective
rationality on the part of police officers.'9 7 The Fourth Amendment is, af-
ter all, a reflection of our society's system of values, and striking the proper
balance between government and individual interests ultimately rests on a
value-laden assessment of the comparative social utility of allowing or pro-
hibiting the intrusion in question.
When the ultimate test of reasonableness is seen to be dependent upon
the social utility of the challenged search or seizure, judicial adoption of the
police perspective reverts to a form of pragmatic utilitarianism in which the
identity of the decision maker has been blurred. If the judiciary measures
the social utility of a search or seizure, then invoking the officer's perspec-
tive is flimsy camouflage because it is the Court, not the police officer, who
functions as the decision maker. Thus, when the Court states that an officer
acted reasonably (appropriately), the Court has announced its ultimate con-
clusion, not a methodology or perspective from which to assess constitution-
ally reasonable searches. In such situations, the Court employs its own ver-
sion of judicial utilitarianism, and "'reasonableness' is merely a grab-bag of
195 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 61 n.196 (1991).
196 Id. at 49-50.
19 The police officer in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), acted rationally, but
unreasonably in the constitutional sense, by following the well-established police prac-
tice of using deadly force against fleeing felons, a practice recognized at common law
and adhered to by a majority of modern police departments. By prohibiting the use of
deadly force to apprehend nondangerous felons, the Court recognized that an
individual's right to life, and society's interest in a fair adjudication of guilt, outweighed
society's interest in effective law enforcement.
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idiosyncratic judicial choices about what kinds of police conduct are good
for society and what kinds are not."19
This covert form of judicial utilitarianism can be avoided only if the
Court truly forgoes its own evaluation of reasonableness in favor of defer-
ring to the officer's decision (so long as the officer acts rationally). 9 If
this is the thrust of embracing the officer's perspective, one can echo Pro-
fessor Maclin's query of "Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?" 2' Is it
plausible that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment intended the Reason-
ableness Clause to insure merely that the police had some minimally rational
basis for exercising their power? Professor Davies has answered this query:
It seems unlikely the Framers would have accepted that the
government can bestow generalized discretionary authority
on a police officer through the credential of a metal police
badge ... when they clearly would not have allowed the
same officer to be given the same generalized discretionary
authority in the form of a paper general warrant.2"'
It is also unlikely that the Framers would have agreed with the Court's
decision in Rodriguez" that it was reasonable for the police to search the
defendant's dwelling without a warrant and without probable cause merely
because the police were confused about who lived where. Allowing the
police to search on the basis of a reasonable, but mistaken, perception of
apparent authority encourages them to maximize their discretion to act as
they think best; however, "if the Framers had this much confidence in exec-
utive branch officials, they probably would not have written the Fourth
Amendment at all. 203
'9 Davies, supra note 166, at 61.
"[I]t is not 'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a
matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his judgement
dictates, following the arrest." Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (emphasis
added).
2 Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government
Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 669 (1988).
201 Davies, supra note 166, at 53 n.203.
202 See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
2 Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seri-
ously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 812 (1992); see also Eric F. Saunders, Case Comment,
Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to Privacy, 52 B.U. L. REV. 831, 843 (1972):
If the [F]ourth [A]mendment were premised on the good faith and self-restraint of
police, its controls would be superfluous. Instead, it functions as a check on abus-
es of authority and the worst tendencies of government which courts should antic-
ipate whenever the police are given an unrestricted license to [investigate] ....
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In the days before pragmatic balancing of interests dominated the
Court's analysis of searches and seizures," 4 the Warrant Clause was
viewed as recognizing that the Amendment was not intended to enshrine the
decision-making power of the police, subject only to ex ante review of a
police officer's rationality. A basic goal of the Warrant Clause is the desire
to disable the police as decision makers by avoiding the need for them to
make judgments as to the propriety of searches and seizures.
The point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."
The danger of police overzealousness infects all situations in which they act
without a warrant, particularly when they act upon apparent or ambiguous
consent. The appropriate question in Rodriguez,"7 therefore, was not
whether the police must be perfectly accurate in assessing facts, but whether
they "should be allowed to enter a home on the basis of their own assess-
ment of a third-party's status and authority when they are not allowed to
enter on the basis of their own assessment of probable cause."2 8 In
Jimeno,' 9 the appropriate question was, "Whose Amendment Is It, Any-
way?" and that question should have been answered by giving the citizen,
204 See Ronald J. Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, But Opening Old Wounds in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 597 (1986) (discussing the Court's
vacillation between the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause as the dominant
concern of the Fourth Amendment).
205
The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that
executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with
our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved
through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different
branches and levels of Government.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (citations omitted).
' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); see also Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("We must remember that the
extent of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the
officers interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit.").
207 See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
28 Davies, supra note 166, at 70.
209 See supra text accompanying note 119.
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not the police, the benefit of any doubt about the scope of consent to search
containers in an automobile.
Although the Warrant Clause serves to check police overzealousness,
prior judicial approval in the form of an arrest or search warrant often is
impossible to obtain. The Court is thus compelled to identify exigent cir-
cumstances that excuse the absence of a warrant. Adjusting Fourth Amend-
ment standards to account for emergencies, however, does not justify the
Court's leap to assessing the propriety of all intrusions according to a police
officer's mistaken, but forgivable, view of the circumstances. For example,
in Rodriguez, the Court claimed that assessing a person's authority to con-
sent to a search of another's residence "is the sort of recurring factual ques-
tion to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their
judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it
reasonably."21 The Court took as a given that the police must make this
judgment, but the Warrant Clause suggests that the judgment properly lies
with a judicial official authorized to issue search warrants. If there are no
exigencies requiring prompt action, the police should be told that they act at
their peril if they choose to bypass the warrant procedure by relying on
questionable consent."' In such situations, it seems "reasonable" to require
that the police be both rational and correct, because the lack of valid con-
sent negates their sole justification for intruding upon an individual's priva-
cy or liberty.2"2 In the absence of an emergency, submitting questions of
valid consent to a magistrate transfers decision-making power from the
police to the judiciary, an approach that is faithful to at least one view of
* 213the Framers' intent.
The other view of the Framers' intent insists that the Warrant Clause
was designed to eliminate general warrants, while the Reasonableness
Clause was to be the sole measure of the constitutionality of warrantless
searches.21 Even this view, however, does not indicate that the Framers
210 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185.
2" "Police officers, when faced with the choice of relying on consent by a third party
or securing a warrant, should secure a warrant and must therefore accept the risk of
error should they instead choose to rely on consent." Id. at 193 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
212 Valid consent to the intrusion provides a source of legal authority for the intrusion
that would be lacking otherwise. See infra text accompanying note 278.
213 See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43 (1937) (arguing that the War-
rant Clause defines and emphasizes the Reasonableness Clause by identifying "the kind
of search that is not unreasonable"-one carried out with judicial approval).
214 See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41-44
(1969) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment was intended as a condemnation of general
warrants and a preference for special warrants, and that the Framers expressed no view
on warrantless searches other than that they be reasonable).
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intended to give police a general amnesty for all reasonable errors. If the
Warrant Clause does not define reasonableness, we are left with the highly
dubious conclusion that the Framers endorsed the Reasonableness Clause as
a "blank check" to be filled in according to the Court's assessment of con-
flicting social interests.2" If such was the Framers' intent, it remains
doubtful that they expected the Court to pass this blank check on to law
enforcement officials who would decide if they had acted responsibly
(though erroneously) under the circumstances; however, the Court need not
rest on attempts to discern the Framers' "original intent" because the
Court's blanket approval of reasonable police errors is unfaithful to its own
balancing approach to reasonableness. In keeping with the flexible nature of
this balancing approach, why hasn't the Court recognized that certain inva-
sions of privacy (for example, the entry of a dwelling or the seizure of a
personal diary) are so serious that even reasonable mistakes cannot be toler-
ated? The Court's rejection of court-ordered surgery to obtain evidence in
Winston v. Lee"6 suggests that certain intrusions upon privacy are prohib-
ited no matter how reasonably the government might act. If the Fourth
Amendment forbids the government's "reasonable" reliance on a court order
for compulsory surgery, how can that same Amendment defer to ad hoc
decisions, even "reasonable" ones, by individual police officers?
By way of summary, the Court's adoption of the police perspective is
unsatisfactory because, in theory, it runs contra to the Framers' distrust of
police discretion and, in practice, it blurs the responsibility for determining
which searches and seizures are constitutionally reasonable. We thus are left
with two troublesome but inescapable realizations: (1) To the extent that the
Court makes an independent assessment of the propriety of an officer's
actions, the individual officer's perception is not the defining measure of
constitutional reasonableness, but merely one factor in the multifaceted ap-
plication of judicial utilitarianism; and (2) to the extent that the Court defers
to the officer's assessment of reasonableness, the Court trivializes the
citizen's interests in privacy and liberty, which properly operate as counter-
weights to the police interest in searching. By deferring to the police, "the
Court has adopted the outlook of the fox in defining the rules that will gov-
ern the henhouse. ' 21
7
215 It is "clearly wrong" to view the Framers as commissioning "the judiciary to
develop a common law of search and seizure as time goes by and as circumstances de-
mand." Bradley, supra note 156, at 851.
216 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). "Notwithstanding the existence of probable
cause," id. at 761, and the state's full compliance with the procedures required by the
Warrant Clause, the Reasonableness Clause demands "a more substantial justification"
for this serious intrusion into the defendant's body, id. at 767.
27 Maclin, supra note 200, at 675.
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C. The Reasonable Person's Perspective
On one level, the reasonable person perspective is but a variation on the
police perspective. If we accept the premise that Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness is a rational, commonsensical determination, then all reasonable
people, whether police officers or civilians, can make this determination.21
The primary objection to the use of the police perspective is not that police
are incapable of applying logic to the totality of the circumstances, but that
their one-sided view of law enforcement skewed their objectivity. As be-
tween equally rational police officers and hypothetical people, we should
prefer the judgment of those better suited to appreciate the importance of
both law enforcement and individual liberty. 9
As between hypothetical people and impartial judges, however, the rea-
sonable person perspective is meaningless so long as the Court adheres to
the position that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a rational,
commonsensical determination. Judges are rational people who can apply
their common sense directly to a situation without the superfluous step of
filtering it through the perceptions of a reasonable person. After all, by
invoking the reasonable person perspective, a judge is not saying, "I am
going to decide this case reasonably, in contrast to my normal practice of
acting irrationally." If there is an objectively correct constitutional interpre-
tation to be derived from rational analysis, the identity of the decision maker
searching for the answer makes little difference. Except for fools, knaves,
and "overzealous" police officers, all reasonable decision makers can be
guided, pushed, or prodded toward the demonstrably correct answer. When
Fourth Amendment interpretation is reduced to the simple process of apply-
ing logic to facts, judges need not adopt any perspective but their own. One
rational person will do as well as another.
2 For example, Justice Scalia conceded that when a judge resolves the reasonable-
ness of a search or seizure by invoking "nothing better than a totality of the circum-
stances test to explain his decision, he is not so much pronouncing the law in the nor-
mal sense as engaging in the less exalted function of fact-finding." Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180-81 (1989). Justice
Scalia volunteered his inclination "to leave that essentially factual determination to the
lower courts," id. at 1186, and questioned why the next logical step would not be to
leave the question to the jury, see id. at 1188. For a consideration of the use of juries to
resolve Fourth Amendment issues, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back
into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1994). !
219 See United States v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1988) (defining
the term "reasonable person" as one who is "neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus
overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances") (quoting
United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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The perspective of the decision maker becomes crucial, however, if
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is seen as a matter of political, not mere-
ly logical, choice as to the appropriate balance of government and individual
interests. Under this view, the Court's references to simple common sense
must be put aside in order to focus on that which is unique about the rea-
sonable person perspective. It is not the innate common sense of the univer-
sal man that provides unique guidance to the Court. Rather, the collective
wisdom of reasonable and political people living together in a society strikes
a real, not a hypothetical, accommodation between an interest in law en-
forcement and an interest in personal autonomy. This accommodation some-
times takes the form of public debate over the latest Supreme Court decision
or proposed legislation affecting privacy interests. More often, the accom-
modation is worked out quietly in day-to-day living conditions that reflect
our realization that, although we may all wish to be let alone, we do not
expect this to happen in any absolute sense. Like life itself, the Fourth
Amendment is a compromise that reflects our "societal understanding" that
certain aspects of our lives are within the public domain, while "certain
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government inva-
sion.'" When pushed hard enough, the Court drops the facade of equat-
ing reasonableness with common sense, and concedes that Fourth Amend-
ment law may turn on "understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society."" To the extent that the Court relies on what "society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable,"' 2 the constitutional standard is a normative
one. The reasonable person's understanding of current social conventions
thus describes the existing social compromise rather than prescribes some
ideal utilitarian society. In this way, the Fourth Amendment's Reasonable-
ness Clause is like the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause, which "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decen-
cy that mark the progress of a maturing society." '223
A good deal of the Court's current Fourth Amendment doctrine can be
explained in terms of a search for conventional morality: All things con-
sidered, have the police comported with the community's moral intu-
itions?'2 The meaning of Fourth Amendment reasonableness thus derives
220 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (quoting Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)
(noting that, although not all subjective expectations of privacy are legitimate, those
based on property rights are likely to be).
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12.
222 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
22 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Under-
standings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993) ("If one
takes the Justices at their word, a sense of how (innocent) U.S. citizens gauge the im-
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from the culture in which "we the people" live, and the Court views society
as the ultimate arbiter of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Of course,
society speaks with many voices, but, at least in theory, the reasonable per-
son perspective constitutes a form of "virtual representation" in which the
hypothesized reasonable person stands for all citizens because they are "en-
visioned as a fungible collection with characteristic insights and out-
looks.""22 If we wish to wax dramatic, the reasonable person epitomizes
the universal soldier in the struggle for democracy, standing as a rough
proxy for the people, "feeling and thinking just as the people do in all their
plurality, acting just as the people would if actually present."2 This
sounds plausible enough in theory until we consider the methodology the
Court is to employ when discerning the characteristic insights and outlooks
of the common man. If a process of intuitive appraisal was at work in
Montoya,227 which Justice instinctively captured our shared understand-
ings? On one side stood Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concluded that rea-
sonable people understand and expect that they are subject to intense scruti-
ny when crossing international borders.2 ' On the other side stood Justice
Brennan, who maintained that international travelers do not "'expect' to be
thrown into locked rooms and ordered to excrete into wastebaskets, held
incommunicado until they cooperate, or led away in handcuffs to the nearest
hospital for exposure to various medical procedures-all on nothing more
than the 'reasonable' suspicions of low-ranking enforcement agents."'229
If the Justices cannot agree on some rough intuitive appraisal of the
reasonable person's understanding of privacy and autonomy, perhaps the
Justices are to rely on their personal experiences. If so, they may lack the
tools required for the task. Unlike the police who are too caught up in the
heat of the chase, judges are too detached from the realities of search and
seizure because they are unlikely to have experienced any type of police
intrusion," ° much less the type of intrusion they were asked to analyze in
pact of police investigative techniques on their privacy and autonomy is highly relevant
to current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.").
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term--Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 3, 51 (1986).
226 Id. at 53.
227 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
See id. at 537-41.
229 Id. at 560 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230 See Dorthy K. Kagehiro, Psycholegal Research on the Fourth Amendment, 1 PSY-
CHOL. SCI. 187, 188 (1990). Because judges are post hoc observers of the situation,
[t]his difference in perspective may result in differences in perceived voluntariness
of consent and perceived "coerciveness" in the phrasing of the search request.
Attribution theory and research suggest that there may be differences in the de-
gree of choice (i.e., voluntariness of consent) attributed to the consentor-actor by
a judicial observer, based on differences in perspective.
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Montoya. Unable to draw upon their own experience and lacking direct
access to the community's shared understandings, the Justices will not often
find that a hypothesized reasonable person's assessment of Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness differs from the Justices' own assessment. "[T]he dis-
tinction between the subjective or individual and the objective or general
conscience, in the field where the judge is not limited by established rules,
is shadowy and evanescent, and tends to become one of words and little
more." 3
There is also little hope for a Justice who puts aside personal values and
experiences while searching for objectivity in empirical evidence of
society's shared understandings. Preliminary attempts to identify these un-
derstandings indicate that the Court is out of touch with society's evalua-
tions of "the privacy and autonomy interests implicated by searches and sei-
zures."2 32 For example, in Whren v. United States,2 33 the Court main-
tained that the subjective motivation underlying a police intrusion is irrele-
vant so long as there is an objective basis for the arrest.2" In a survey of
citizens' perceptions, however, Professors Slobogin and Schumacher demon-
strated that police motivation is an important factor in assessing the intru-
siveness of their actions. A preliminary sampling of citizens' perceptions
found that a frisk to detect and deter hijacking or terrorism at an airport was
viewed as beneficial and that citizens felt genuinely grateful for the govern-
ment intervention designed to protect them.235 In light of the Court's refus-
al in Whren to examine the officer's motivation for an intrusion upon priva-
cy, citizens understandably are skeptical of all government intrusions in
which the officer's motivation is unknown or ambiguous.
Although Professors Slobogin's and Schumacher's preliminary attempts
to discern social conventions are helpful, we must not allow such efforts to
create false hope that, with more refined techniques, the Court will be able
to correctly read community consensus. For example, consider the belief
that the Court would not need to speculate on the perceptions of a hypothe-
sized reasonable person if there were direct and instantaneous access to the
populace via some futuristic computer network.23 Even if future technolo-
11 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 110 (1921). The
Supreme Court has noted that an unstructured determination of reasonableness often is
merely a statement of personal values. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65
(1969).
232 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 224, at 760.
233 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996); see supra text accompanying note 79.
234 See supra text accompanying note 83.
2" See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 224, at 767.
236 The Court has attempted to determine society's views on reasonableness by such
.means as reference to a telephone book. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
741-46 (1979) (noting that society would not recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in numbers dialed from the defendant's phone because the telephone book in-
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gy were to allow the Court to identify that which is usually done in the
community, and thus what is reasonable in a normative sense, determina-
tions of Fourth Amendment reasonableness still would involve value judge-
ments and political choices about what ought to be done.237 As the Court
recently noted, "[i]t is always somewhat dangerous to ground exceptions to
constitutional protections in the social norms of a given historical mo-
ment. ,, 8
When contrasts arise between matters of principle and social policy,
between individual rights and collective interests, 239 the concern no longer
is about which methodology, as an empirical matter will better identify com-
munity consensus. The primary concern is whether a democratic majority
may impose its will on the minority. Although the constitutional Framers
may have placed great trust in the citizenry's judgment, the Framers also
recognized that certain individual rights must be shielded from the popular
will." ° "The Founding Fathers thus wisely sought to have the best of both
worlds, the undeniable benefits of both democratic self-government and
individual rights protected against possible excesses of that form of govern-
ment."241 This original intent, coupled with Marbury v. Madison"2 and
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,243 indicates that Fourth
formation pages disclosed that the phone company could identify the origin of phone
calls). However roughly a survey or computer voting might approximate society's
views, the techniques are superior media for societal conventions as compared to the
abstruse information contained in the pages of a telephone directory.
" See generally Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 384-85. The Fourth Amendment does
not "ask ... what we expect of government. [It] tell[s] us what we should demand of
government." Id. at 384.
238 Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421 n.4 (1997).
239 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1977) (explaining that
individuals have rights apart from those given them by law); JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREA-
TISES OF GOVERNMENT 366-67 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (3d ed. 1698) (noting that government is limited by the individual rights that
people reserved to themselves when they created the government); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-6 (1971) (emphasizing personal rights and protection against
majoritarian tyranny).
240 Discussing the Bill of Rights, James Madison stated:
The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against that quarter
where the greater danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest preroga-
tive of power. But this is not found in either the Executive or the Legislative
departments of Government, but in the body of the people, operating by the ma-
jority against the minority.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
24 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
242 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the Court's preeminence in interpret-
ing the Constitution).
243 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193, 1281 (1992) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment placed heavy
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Amendment rights are not entirely dependent on the popular will.244
In summary, the reasonable person perspective is either meaningless or
anathematic to the Constitution. Judges are as rational as anyone else; there-
fore, it is useless to speak of the reasonable person's rational assessment of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in contrast to a judge's rational assess-
ment. Invoking the reasonable person's perception of community consensus
goes beyond mere rational analysis, but community consensus should not be
the sole measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness unless we reject the
very concept of constitutional rights as a limitation on the tyranny of a dem-
ocratic majority. At most, the reasonable person's perception of community
consensus stands as one factor to be included in the Court's multifaceted
balancing of governmental and individual interests.
D. The Citizen's Perspective
After reviewing the Court's approach to Fourth Amendment seizures,
Professor Williamson concluded that "the perception rather than the fact of a
restriction of freedom of movement" determines whether a person has been
seized.245 Professor Rotenberg, focusing primarily on consensual searches
of property, insists that "[w]hat is counts; not what is perceived."2" This
debate resurrects a classic query of beginning students of epistemology: If a
tree falls in an unoccupied forest, has there been a sound? The answer, of
course, depends entirely upon one's choice of perspective. In the forest of
the Fourth Amendment, adoption of the reasonable person's perspective
means that no matter how deeply felt by the individual, some intrusions
upon personal autonomy do not exist until they are perceived by a hypoth-
esized person.
The danger in ignoring an individual's subjective perspective in favor of
hypothesized perceptions is that the Court replaces real life experience with
a pseudo-scientific perspective that claims to be neutral and objective. 7
Like medieval scholasticism, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has become
an enclosed discipline no longer anchored in reality. Consider the esoteric
result that occurred in United States v. Letsinger,2" when the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals attempted to bridge the gap between Mendenhall's
reliance on federal judges to protect minority rights).
244 But see Bradley, supra note 156, at 817 ("The Reasonableness Clause, properly
understood,... exists to affirm legislative supremacy over the law of search and sei-
zure.").
245 See Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop"
and "Arrest," 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 814 (1982).
24' Rotenberg, supra note 102, at 177.
247 See Laurence H. Tribe, supra note 163 at 156-58.
248 93 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2437 (1997).
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reasonable person test and Hodari D.'s focus on subjective submission to a
show of authority.249 In Letsinger, members of a federal drug task force
confronted the defendant on a train leaving Union Station. When the officers
asked for permission to search the defendant's suitcase, the defendant re-
sponded that he had personal papers in the bag.5 The officers informed
the defendant that they were "going to detain his bag," that "he could re-
trieve it later, and that otherwise he was 'free to do whatever he wanted to
do.' '251 Without touching the bag, the officers continued to converse with
the defendant, who acknowledged that he had a small amount of marijuana
in the bag. 2 Following this admission, the officers searched the bag and
found a large amount of crack cocaine. " The government maintained that
no seizure took place until the officers physically touched the bag, which
occurred only after the defendant's incriminating statement gave them prob-
able cause to seize and search the bag.5 4 The defendant, however, con-
tended that a seizure occurred at the point when the officers stated their
intent to detain the bag-when they made a show of authority sufficient to
effectuate a Fourth Amendment seizure." The Fourth Circuit adopted the
government's position and held that the seizure of the defendant's bag "did
not occur until the officers actually took physical possession of the bag, and
not when they merely announced their intention to do so." 6 According to
the court, the officers' "simple statement that they were 'going to detain his
bag' was calmly uttered during an ongoing, casual, consensual conversation.
It was not phrased as an 'order,' e.g., 'give me your bag,' or even as a
present-tense declarative sentence, e.g., 'your bag is hereby seized.""'57
Viewed from the lofty heights of Fourth Amendment theory, the reason-
ing in Letsinger may be defended as a sophisticated attempt to reconcile
conflicting definitions of a seizure." The final decision, however, violates
29 The Fourth Circuit recognized that Hodari D. "specifically addressed the seizure
of persons," but that "in light of the Court's evolving views on the relevancy of com-
mon law in defining Fourth Amendment 'seizures,' . . . [Hodari D.] may ultimately be
held to extend to objects as well as persons." Id. at 143.
25 See id. at 142.
45 Id.
252 See id.
253 See id.
4 See id. at 143.
4 See id.
256 Id. at 145.
257 Id. at 144.
25 In Letsinger, the Court applied the Hodari D. approach to seizures of a person to
seizures of property. The Court did not address Brower's additional consideration of
"intentional" seizures. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. Consider the facts of
State v. Johnson, 696 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). During an encounter with
the police, a nervous defendant placed his hands in his pockets. See id. at 882. When
the police told him to remove his hands from his pocket, the defendant responded by
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common sense. One wonders how the Fourth Circuit would deal with a
bank robber who were to pull a gun and hand a teller a note with the mes-
sage "I'm going to rob this bank. Don't make any trouble." According to
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, such a note merely would express the
robber's intent to act in the future, and thus no robbery would occur unless
the robber were to utter "a present-tense declarative sentence," such as "I
hereby commence the robbery of this bank." Confronted by armed officers
who announced that they were going to seize the bag and that the defendant
could retrieve it later, the defendant in Letsinger, or anyone else in the real
world, could only perceive that, at that point, the bag was under the control
of the officers. 9 In the rarified world of the Fourth Amendment, however,
the individual is told that his perception is irrelevant. As Professor White
has suggested, this is only a small step from telling the individual that he
himself is irrelevant.
[Judicial discourse can function] as an important force of
social definition and cohesion, placing the individual or
official in a comprehensible public world in ways that he can
respect. But to the extent that the individual or official faces
a public world defined by a language he cannot speak, in
which he cannot locate himself, which does not deal in intel-
ligible ways with claims he regards as important, the dis-
course can be said to be one of authority rather than commu-
nity, its force divisive rather than cohesive."'
In the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment discourse, an individual
defendant becomes a non-person who exists only to the extent that he or she
affects the social welfare as viewed from the perspective of a pseudo-scien-
tific balancing of government and individual interests. This neglect of the
citizen's perspective conflicts with one of the fundamental moral tenets of
Western society, that governments must recognize the human dignity and
uniqueness of each individual.26 In Justice Kennedy's words: "The distin-
removing not only his hands, but also the contents of his pockets, which included illegal
drugs. See id. The court did not consider whether this Was the type of "accidental sei-
zure" that Brower placed outside of the Fourth Amendment's coverage.
" "Announcement of the officers' intent to detain luggage is the seizure, because at
that point the traveler's unrestricted liberty to call off the encounter and go unimpeded
about his business ends." Letsinger, 93 F.3d at 146 (Hall, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted). The dissent also argued that "the essence of submission is generally the absence of
physical resistance." Id. at 147 (Hall, J., dissenting).
260 White, supra note 155, at 167.
261 The Fourth Amendment embodies a
commitment to treating persons who come before the law on the basis of their
individual, particular, uncommon, and odd property and attributes. Juristic proce-
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guishing feature of our criminal justice system is its insistence on principled,
accountable decision making in individual cases." 2 Without individuality,
we become fungibles to be manipulated by the government. Judicial deci-
sions no longer are about a real person, but concern an abstraction. Individ-
uals are no longer valued for their individuality; instead they are reduced to
instruments of science freely exploited by the judiciary (the cost-benefit
managers) in an effort to maximize the total pie for society. In short, the
ideal of justice, which incorporates a theory of individual rights, has ceased
to be a weighty factor in the Court's Fourth Amendment discourse.
This pretension of scientific objectivity is purchased at a high price. It
requires the Supreme Court Justices to anaesthetize their hearts 3 and de-
tach themselves from the real human being who stands before them and,
more importantly, from all citizens a defendant represents.' Judicial indif-
ference to the individual's perspective sends a message that individuals are
not valued or trusted, and that they ultimately are powerless to prevent
intrusions on their autonomy because intrusions need not be based on their
individual conduct. 5 Professor Sundby makes a telling point about trust
and power in an article entitled, "Every Man's Fourth Amendment." 2'
Whether intentional or not, Sundby has provided one answer to Professor
Maclin's query as to "Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?" 7
Professor Sundby conceptualizes the question of choosing perspectives
as an issue of who to trust and who should be given control. His starting
point for Fourth Amendment interpretation is that citizens are to be trusted
to act responsibly and are entitled "to be let alone" unless they forfeit this
right by engaging in suspicious conduct.26 Grounding the Fourth Amend-
dures which help show the unique characteristics of individuals and actions to the
decision-maker provide the factual evidentiary base for legal judgments which
avoid abstract moral structures and remain useful as explanations of external phe-
nomena.
Gary A. Ahrens, Privacy and Property: Can They Remain After Juridical Personality Is
Lost?, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1077, 1082 (1977); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBER-
TY AGAINST GOVERNMENT xiii (1948) (stating that the struggle for liberty against gov-
ernment is "the oldest theme which underlies the history of American constitutional
law"); Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV.
219, 229 (1965) ("The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citi-
zen.").
262 Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 890 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
263 Professor Tribe cautioned against using the passive voice, which "makes it look as
though someone out there, unspecified, is doing it to us. Admit that it's we who are
doing it." Tribe, supra note 163, at 170.
264 See supra text accompanying note 173.
265 See supra text accompanying note 157.
266 Sundby, supra note 139, at 1767.
267 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
268 "So long as a person does not engage in behavior arising to probable cause of a
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ment in the reality of citizens' actual conduct thus allows citizens to main-
tain control over their fate by giving them the opportunity to structure their
conduct in a manner that denies the government any justification for intrud-
ing upon their autonomy. Citizens lose control, however, when the Court
announces, for example, that the police need no justification for approaching
citizens and posing questions to them. 9 In such situations, citizens are
powerless to avoid intrusions unless they forego a legal activity such as
walking a public street where they might encounter police.
Adopting the individual citizen's perspective would not require the
Court to surrender control of searches and seizures to the individual in all
situations. Professor Maclin's query-" Whose Amendment Is It Any-
way?"-nicely captures the essence of the debate over perspectives, but it is
not an all-or-nothing choice. When the government bases its action on some
factual justification such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the
Fourth Amendment is neither exclusively the government's nor exclusively
the citizen's. Without claiming exclusivity, however, the citizen legitimately
may ask that the Court be more sensitive to the individual's perspective
when balancing the government's and the individual's conflicting interests.
One need not undertake a sophisticated ethical or legal analysis to under-
stand that intrusiveness must be viewed from the perspective of the individ-
ual upon whom an intrusion was made because privacy and autonomy are
intimate, subjective, and experiential constructs.
In common parlance, privacy is "I know when I see it," an
elusive construct that has unclear and probably idiosyncratic
limits. Indeed, privacy (more precisely, invasion thereof)
may be described better as "I know when I feel it." A gut
sense of personal violation may be the tie that binds such
disparate events as being subjected to a body search, being
the subject of gossip, having one's mail read, being asked
one's income, or.having one's house entered without permis-
sion. It should come as no surprise that such an intensely
personal construct is difficult to define .... In short, com-
mon experience tells us that privacy is a subjectively impor-
tant, even critical, aspect of our lives ...."
criminal violation, individual privacy cannot be invaded." Sundby, supra note 139, at
1768.
269 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) ("Our cases make it clear that a
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and
asks a few questions.").
270 Gary B. Melton, Respecting Boundaries: Minors, Privacy and Behavioral Re-
search, in SOCIAL RESEARCH ON CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 65 (Barbara Stanley &
Joan E. Sieber eds., 1992).
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A court with heightened sensitivity to the citizen's perspective will ex-
pand the concepts of privacy and autonomy to include the citizen's subjec-
tive concern with freedom from harassment and fear of being stigmatized by
government officials who single out the individual for unequal treat-
ment."' This stigmatizing often rests on the unpleasant reality that race
affects many encounters between police and citizens. It is no accident that
the chief critic of the Court's neglect of the individual's perspective was
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the sole African-American to serve for most of
the Court's history.272
What separated Justice Marshall from other members of the
Court was his "citizen perspective." His Fourth Amendment
opinions display a "candor that cut through legal abstractions
to the social reality" that exists on the street. He scrutinizes
police claims of necessity and practicality, instead of assum-
ing that the police are always a "friend.
273
Justice Marshall knew that race colors most situations in which whites and
blacks interact, yet the current Court insists on a color-blind approach
"when a color-conscious approach would lend perspective to the situation of
a black participant in the legal process."274 For example, in Hodari D.,
Justice Scalia suggested that the lower court may have erred by not having
realized that the suspect's flight upon sighting the police cruiser amounted
to suspicious behavior that justified a stop and frisk.2 " This viewpoint ig-
271 When two individuals are treated differently, the officer
should be able to point to some distinction between the two cases which it is
permissible for him to consider .... [H]e must at least be able to show ... that
cases treated differently were in fact different in some relevant respect-that is,
that he is following some sort of rational, non-discriminatory rule. If he cannot
make such a showing, his different treatment of the two cases is irrational or
invidious, and hence violative of equal, protection.
J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 594 (1972) (review-
ing KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969)).
Although Judge Wright was referring to prosecutors, his observation applies equally to
police officers.
272 See Maclin, supra note 203. Professor Maclin suggests that Marshall's citizen
perspective was based on personal experience: "'A dangerous, humiliating, sometimes
fatal encounter with the police is almost a rite of passage for a black man in the United
States.' Even a black man who becomes a Justice on the United States Supreme Court
can recall such an encounter." Id. at 723 (quoting Don Wycliff, Blacks and Blue Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1987, at A22).
273 Id. at 799 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Marshall, the Great Dissenter, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1991, at L23).
274 Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Origi-
nal Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 80.
275 "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 623 n.1 (quot-
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nored the fact that Hodari, a black youth, may have had other reasons for
wanting to avoid the police. Perhaps Hodari D. shared a viewpoint ex-
pressed in the aftermath of the race riots in Los Angeles in 1991:176
"When black people in Los Angeles see a police car approach-
ing, ... '[t]hey don't know whether justice will be meted out or whether
judge, jury and executioner is pulling up behind them. ''2 77
Asking the Court to be more sensitive to the individual perspective,
including the racial aspects of police-citizen encounters, would help equalize
the weights on either side of the balancing equation. As long as the Court
adheres to its balancing of interests approach, however, Fourth Amendment
issues will continue to be assessed from multiple perspectives because the
police, the individual, and collective society all have a stake in the outcome.
There is, however, a situation in which the Fourth Amendment becomes
uniquely and exclusively the citizen's amendment and the individual's per-
spective rises to a controlling role. When the police purport to rely on a
citizen's cooperation, the individual need not ask that the Court be sensitive
to his perspective; the individual may demand that the Court recognize the
individual's subjective perspective as paramount "because the sole validating
source of police authority to intrude on a premier constitutional right is the
individual's grant of permission.' ', 78
Why should the citizen's decision to grant or withhold cooperation be
assessed in terms of objective reasonableness or social welfare? Whefi the
police ask for cooperation to which they are not entitled, the individual
should retain the power to grant or withhold cooperation at the individual's
discretion-rational or otherwise. When the police purport to rely on citizen
cooperation to justify an intrusion, the right to personal autonomy must not
be set aside by judicial fictions that a reasonable person would somehow
approve of what the government did when, in fact, the actual defendant
vehemently denies that he gave any approval or voluntary cooperation. If
the intruding officer thus cannot point to any objective facts justifying the
ing Proverbs 28:1).
276 The rioting was sparked by the acquittal of four Los Angeles police officers
whose beating of black motorist Rodney King was captured on videotape for all the
world to see. The rioting resulted in 60 deaths, more than 16,000 arrests, and nearly one
billion dollars in property damage. See Seth Mydans, Tape of Beating by Police Revives
Charge of Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at A18.
277 Richard W. Stevenson, Los Angeles Chief Taunted at Hearing; U.S. Plans Wide
Inquiry on Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1991, at A16. See generally Tracey Maclin,
"Black and Blue Encounters "-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment
Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243 (1991) (discussing whether
race should be taken into account when considering reactions of black Americans in
arrest situations).
278 Rotenberg, supra note 102, at 177.
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intrusion, and if the officer's sole claim is that the citizen agreed to the
intrusion, then the only relevant perspective is that of the individual citizen,
who must be taken as the officer finds him-subjective warts and all.
If exclusive reliance on the individual perspective seems to unduly im-
pugn the legitimacy of the government's and society's interests, we must
remember that the preeminence of the individual perspective is limited to
situations in which the government can formulate no independent justifica-
tion for intruding on the citizen's right to be let alone. A recurring problem
in the Court's analysis of searches and seizures is its tendency to treat con-
sent as one of the many exceptions to the requirements of probable cause
and a warrant; but it is the citizen's freedom to choose that renders consent
searches unique among exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirements
of probable cause and a warrant. Most of the exceptions are based on the
overriding needs of law enforcement to react to exigent circumstances that
make it impractical to obtain a warrant or to wait until full probable cause
develops. Consent searches and consensual police-citizen encounters, how-
ever, have nothing to do with the overriding needs of law enforcement be-
cause probable cause to search or seize may be totally lacking. Consensual
intrusions upon personal autonomy are permitted "not because such an ex-
ception to the requirements of probable cause and warrant is essential to
proper law enforcement, but because we permit our citizens to choose
whether or not they wish to exercise their constitutional rights."279 A soci-
ety that "presupposes the capacity of its members to choose""2 must rec-
ognize that an individual is free to grant or withhold cooperation requested
by government officials.2"
The fundamental right of individuals to control their own fate by exer-
cising or waiving constitutional rights must take precedence over a police
officer's mistaken perception of consent, no matter how objectively reason-
able or understandable the mistake may have been. From the police perspec-
tive, the only sensible guide is that
they should never rely on consent as the basis for a search
unless they must. If they do search relying on consent, they
should be prepared to meet a heavy burden of proof that
consent was in fact meaningfully given. And even then, be-
cause of the difficulties of proof, they should expect to be
told often that the search was not proper. 2
279 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 283 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result)).
"' "[A]n individual through the exercise of will, a personal power, [may or may not
supply] the police with the keys to his kingdom." Rotenberg, supra note 102, at 179.
282 Weinreb, supra note 25, at 64. Compare the conduct of the police officer in Ohio
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The police may use the reasonable person perspective as circumstantial
evidence of a defendant's subjective state of mind, just as they often use
circumstantial evidence to prove premeditation in a murder prosecution in
which the defendant denies such an intent. 3 Considering what a reason-
able person would have intended constitutes evidence of what the defendant
actually intended, but the ultimate test for a consensual search or seizure
remains subjective, not objective.
The commitment to a "society of free choice"2 also means that when
addressing consensual searches and seizures, the individual perspective must
take precedence over society's interests. For example, in Jimeno, the Court
broadly interpreted the scope of the defendant's consent because of the
community's interest in "encouraging consent." 5 This assertion is either
misleading or misguided. The community may encourage consent all it
wishes, but the final decision to accept or reject such entreaties must remain
with the individual unless we have moved from "encouraging" consent to
imposing the community's will on the individual. In the absence of an im-
mediate crisis threatening society's well being, the autonomy of the individ-
ual remains paramount. Consensual searches and seizures thus comprise one
of the rare areas in constitutional law in which an absolute rule is appropri-
ate. Any consent obtained must be true subjective consent, rendered only
after the individual has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right
to be let alone. It is in this sense that the Fourth Amendment is exclusively
the citizen's, and thus the individual citizen's subjective perspective is the
appropriate viewpoint from which to assess government claims of consent.
III. CONCLUSION
There are few absolutes in constitutional law, and an unqualified right to
be let alone is not one of them. In most cases there is no escaping a prag-
matic approach to reconciling societal interests with individual rights be-
cause, in some situations, social concerns may override what were previous-
ly regarded as absolute rights. Our faith in treating individuals as ends in
themselves can be tested by posing a hypothetical: Assume that torture, or
some form of intrusion upon the personal autonomy of a terrorist, would
disclose the location of a pirated atomic bomb threatening the lives of mil-
v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996), who "routinely requested permission to search
automobiles he stopped for traffic violations .... He requested consent to search in 786
traffic stops in 1992 .... " Id. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgement).
23 Being professionally trained and having initiated the encounter with the citizen,
"the police are better able than the private person to plan the encounter so that if con-
sent is given, proof of it will be available." Weinreb, supra note 25, at 57.
284 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result)).
285 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252; see supra text accompanying note 122.
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lions. This classic dilemma for a democratic society may be resolved either
by adopting society's interest as paramount to individual rights, or by allow-
ing individual rights to prevail over societal concerns. The dilemma cannot
be resolved from any other perspective, certainly not from the perspectives
suggested by the Court-not by asking whether the police officers had a
rational basis for concluding that torture was appropriate; not by canvassing
the community to determine whether a majority approve of torture; and not
by speculating as to whether a hypothesized reasonable person would prefer
torture to the loss of millions of lives.
In a constitutional democracy in which neither individual autonomy nor
collective security may completely dominate the other, reconciling or ac-
commodating the conflict between government and individual interests is a
daunting task. What we may ask from the Court is that it face the task in a
forthright manner by forsaking what Professor Tribe described as a tendency
to "[a]bdicat[e] responsibility for choice."2 6 The Court's claim that the
perspectives of citizens, police officers, or hypothetical people can resolve
constitutional questions is disingenuous. The Court, however, may ask that
its critics temper their attacks on its use of balancing tests. Unless the acad-
emy can offer the Court a superior replacement, we are obliged to help the
Court refine and improve all forms of judicial interest balancing. This Arti-
cle attempts to meet this obligation by suggesting that the Court must dis-
play increased sensitivity to the individual's perspective when interpreting
the Fourth Amendment, and by suggesting that the Court may utilize a
"small absolute" (the individual's subjective perspective) when assessing
consensual searches and seizures.
IV. POSTSCRIPT
The task for another day is to assess the role that various perspectives
play in the interpretation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. For example,
in Colorado v. Connelly,287 the Court held that a psychotic defendant who
suffered from a compulsion to confess could nevertheless voluntarily waive
his Miranda rights and make a voluntary confession. The Court's path to
Connelly closely parallels the evolving view of Fourth Amendment perspec-
tives addressed in this Article. A decade after the Court in Boyd v. United
States" utilized legal formalism to interpret individuals' Fourth Amend-
ment rights, the Court in Bram v. United States" interpreted the Fifth
Amendment by focusing on the individual's perspective and his capacity to
make a voluntary statement. Like the right to be secure against unreasonable
Tribe, supra note 163, at 170.
7 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
288 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see supra text accompanying notes 131, 133.
s 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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searches and seizures, freedom from self-incrimination initially was charac-
terized as the inherent right of the citizen to individual dignity, self-preser-
vation, and self-determination. In Connelly, however, the Court eliminated
any consideration of a defendant's capacity for self-determination,... while
focusing exclusively on the police officer's perspective. According to
Connelly:
The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which
Miranda was based, is governmental coercion. Indeed, the
Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned "with moral and
psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources
other than official coercion." The voluntariness of a waiver
of this privilege has always depended on the absence of
police overreaching, not on "free choice" in any broader
sense of the word.29'
As is true of the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court's Fifth
Amendment analysis increasingly has adopted the officer's viewpoint by
asking whether the officer acted "appropriately." Little concern has been
given to the individual's perspective and the underlying issue of empower-
ing individuals to control their own fate. The issue of empowerment was of
foremost importance to Justice Marshall, who urged the Court to recognize
that the Fourth Amendment embodies our commitment to a "society of free
choice." '292 In a similar vein, Justice Brennan bemoaned the majority's re-
fusal, in Connelly, .to acknowledge free will as a value of constitutional
consequence."293 There are many other similarities between the Court's ap-
proach to Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues, but at this point any detailed
effort to resolve the conflict of perspectives presented in cases like Connelly
is postponed.294 This brief comment on Connelly is offered merely to illus-
trate that the approach used in this Article points the way toward a princi-
pled choice of perspectives that can be applied to all aspects of criminal
procedure. Finding the correct perspective on the relationship between indi-
vidual free will and collective state power is the essence of criminal proce-
dure.
29 "Respondent would now have us require sweeping inquiries into the state of mind
of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion
brought to bear on the defendant by the State." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67.
291 Id. at 170 (citations omitted).
292 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
293 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 176 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
294 For a discussion of Connelly, see Benner, supra note 91, at 66.
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